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IV 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In her Brief (filed on or about July 19, 2006), Plaintiff Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
(hereinafter, "Plaintiff) combined her response to Defendants'/Appellants' (hereinafter, 
"Defendants") Brief and her own principal Brief which presents several new issues. This 
Reply Brief will serve as a reply to Plaintiffs response to Defendant's principal Brief and 
will also address the new enumerated issues raised by Plaintiff in her Brief. Issues I 
through III are those issues initially raised by Defendants in their principal Brief to which 
Plaintiff responded. Issues IV through VIII are new issues raised by Plaintiff in her July 
19, 2006 Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DETERMINE WHICH 
STATUTE OF LIMITITATIONS VERSION GOVERNED THE CASE 
A. The Defendants Preserved This Issue For Appeal. 
In Utah, "when a defendant fails to object to jury instruction at trial, [Utah 
appellate courts] will consider an alleged error on appeal only where it falls into the 
category of plain error." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 178 (Utah App. Ct. 1992). 
Although the plain error rule is commonly used in criminal appeals, Utah courts have also 
applied the same rule in civil appellate matters. See Diversified Holdings, L.C., v. Turner, 
63 P.3d 686, 692-93 (Utah 2002) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 51(d) and stating that "unless a 
party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not 
be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice...[This] rule applies in both 
criminal and civil contexts."). In the instant case, the Court may properly review the issue 
of whether the trial court erred when it submitted questions of law to the jury because 
such error falls within the plain error rule and a review of such issue an is necessary to 
avoid a manifest injustice. 
Neither party in the instant matter dispute the fact that the contract for the sale of 
the home at issue closed no later than May 2, 1994. Furthermore, both parties agree that 
Plaintiffs did not file their Complaint until August 24, 2000. According to the law applied 
by the trial court (as evidenced by Jury Instruction No. 31) [Jury Instruction No. 31 is 
attached to Defendants' Brief, Addendum "19], "Utah law provides that an action for 
construction defect based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of 
the closing of the sale of the house." 
Jury Instruction No. 31 also contains the following language: "Utah law provides 
that an action for fraudulent nondisclosure shall be commenced within two years of the 
time that Plaintiffs discovered their cause of actions for fraudulent nondisclosure or the 
date upon which such cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable 
diligence." Jury Instruction No. 31 also states that "Plaintiffs filed their suit on August 
24, 2000." 
Given the undisputed facts that the home at issue closed on or before May 2, 1994 
and that Plaintiffs did not file their suit until August 24, 2000, the trial court erred by 
requesting the jury to make a determination concerning the statute of limitations on 
Plaintiffs' contract claims. The trial court committed plain error by submitting the statute 
of limitations question to the jury because on its face, the court's own instruction barred 
all of Plaintiff s contractual claims. Moreover, because the jury was not instructed to 
determine an accrual date for Plaintiffs causes of action (a question of fact), the legal 
2 
conclusion by the jury that Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims were not barred is 
unsupported. 
Review of the trial court's error is essential to avoid the manifest injustice caused 
by a complete disregard for obvious facts and applicable law. Without review, Defendants 
will be denied the proper protection afforded by Utah law and will be forced to pay a 
$30,680.00 judgment, and at least $50,000.00 in attorney's fees and costs despite the 
clear fact that Plaintiff did not file any of her claims until more than six years from the 
closing of the sale of the house. Given that the home was sold to Plaintiff and her 
husband for only $83,000.00, Defendants have suffered a manifest injustice in being 
required to pay Plaintiff $80,680.00 (nearly the entire cost of the home itself). 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold that the trial court did commit 
plain error and that failure to review such error will result in a manifest injustice, thereby 
providing proper grounds for the Court to review the instant matter. 
B. The Trial Court Erred In Failing to Correctly Determine the 
Appropriate Version of the Relevant Statute of Limitations. 
In a case where the central issue is whether the cause of action is barred by 
operation of a statute of limitations, it is of primary importance to establish, through a 
finding of fact, the approximate date on which the cause of action accrued. 
"A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when a reasonable 
person knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of both the 
injury and its governing cause." Matson v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 
1235 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "'Generally, a cause of action accrues upon the 
3 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.'" Spears v, Warr, 
2002 UT 24, \ 33, 44 P.3d 742 (quoting Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 
1996)) (other internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The general requirement that the appropriate fact-finder in a case establish an 
approximate date as to when a cause of action accrued is doubly pressing in the case 
because (as explained in Defendants' initial Brief), several versions of the relevant statute 
of limitations provisions existed between the time that Plaintiff and her husband 
purchased the house in 1994 and when they finally filed their suit over six years later. 
As fully detailed in Defendants' initial Brief, application of the appropriate 
version of the relevant statutory provision will determine whether Plaintiffs claims (both 
in contract and tort) should be barred by the statute of limitations. 
Defendants are not confused as to which version of the statute of limitations 
should apply. Defendants' believe (and the trial court intimated) that Plaintiffs claims 
were all reasonably discoverable at the time the earnest money sales agreement 
("EMS A") was executed (on February 15, 1994). If this is the case, then the "accrual" 
date of Plaintiff s causes of action was February 15, 1994 and, accordingly, the 1991 
version of the statute of limitations should have applied. Application of that version 
would have barred all of Plaintiff s claims. As discussed below, Plaintiff is not entitled to 
rely upon an equitable tolling argument—however, even if equitable tolling did apply, an 
accrual date of February 15, 1994 would mean that any equitable tolling of the statue of 
limitations would have ended on that same date. 
It is important to re-emphasize that the statute of limitations, in all its variations, 
4 
demands that a specific date be determined as to when a cause of action accrues in order 
for the appropriate version of the statute to apply. 
In the instant case, the trial court failed to clearly establish, through a finding of 
fact, the specific date on which Plaintiff and her husband discovered or should have 
discovered the facts forming the basis for their causes of action. As a consequence of not 
having determined the specific time frame on which to base its decisions of law, the trial 
court committed reversible error. 
The most obvious example of the trial court's error in applying the statute is 
evidenced in the split ruling of its September 29, 2003 Order on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In the Order, the lower court ruled that: 
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in 
part in accordance with the following. 
2. Plaintiffs admitted that all defects except defects 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 
39 were patent and not latent defects and could have been discovered by a 
home inspection. (Court's decision at page 5.) In addition, the court 
determines that defect items 12 and 38 are patent defects. Therefore, the 
motion for summary judgment is granted regarding plaintiffs 'fraudulent 
nondisclosure claims as to all defects except 9,11, 26, 27 and 39. 
3. This construction defect case is governed by the Utah Code Section 78-12-
21.5 of which subsection (3) (a) provides that an action by or against a 
provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six 
years of the date of completion of the improvement (Decision at page 6.) 
Subsection (3)(b) provides that all other causes of action against the 
provider shall be commenced within two years of the discovery of a cause 
of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been 
discovered through reasonable diligence. In accordance with UCA 78-12-
21.5 (3)(b) the discovery rule applies in this case. Plaintiffs have created 
material issues of fact as to when such defects were first discovered and 
therefore summary judgment as to such relief is denied. [See Defendants' 
Brief, Addendum "9", emphasis added]. 
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In analyzing the lower court's ruling, the emphasized segments clearly suggest that 
the trial court actually premised its decision to dismiss the Fraudulent Nondisclosure 
claim as to certain "patent" defects because they were discoverable by the process of a 
home inspection. In ruling that some defects were patent and that those defects could 
have been discoverable by a home inspection, the lower court made a ruling of law and 
established the date on which the Plaintiff discovered or should have discovered defects 
in the home. 
In Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1390 (Utah App. 1994) this Court 
emphasized: 
The responsibility to observe patent, and any discoverable latent, defects falls 
on the buyer of the home and is usually accomplished by hiring a 
knowledgeable home inspector to scrutinize the home before finalizing a sale. 
Oftentimes, however, real estate agents and sellers are understandably unaware 
of latent defects in the home at the time of sale. This is an inherent risk 
involved in purchasing a home. 
As inferred from the foregoing language, a home inspection generally assists home 
buyers in discovering both patent and latent defects. Accordingly, the trial court's focus 
on the difference between "patent" and "latent" becomes less-relevant. What is important 
is that both types of defects could have been discovered if a home inspection had been 
undertaken at the time the Plaintiff and her husband purchased the home. Again, this is 
highly important, because it establishes the accrual date for Plaintiffs claims. 
It is noteworthy that Plaintiff utterly fails in its Brief to directly establish any point 
at which the jury or the trial court determined an accrual date. Plaintiff tries to convince 
this Court that the jury "obviously concluded that the Moores should not have reasonably 
6 
discovered the footings defects before April of 2000." [See Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 11-12]— 
yet such a conclusion is i low I: iei e to be foi md :"!| s disci issed hei einaftei ., all v ei sions of 
U'.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 after 1991 distinguish between "contract/warranty" causes of action, 
and all "other" types of causes of action. 1:\ en il the accrual date for the claims on the 
!.>.>tw»^  hirjih 'v Anri! ^ ,!i Plaintiff s Breach of Contract claim would be 
barred because the statue of limitations provides a strict period within which 
contt act \ v at i: ant claims i:iia> be bi oi lght . •
 ; . • . 
C The trial court erred m implying the Discovery Rule. 
The trial court erred in applying the discovery rule to this case ana me rlaintiff is 
incoi i e ::t it i h sr analysis of the applicability of the discovery rule. 
Legislature has affirmatively left equitable discovery/tolling 
out of the language of the U.C.A , § 78-12-21 5 
The whole purpose for U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5 is to provide a limit on actions related 
to improvements in real property. Plaintiff has completely failed to grasp that in enacting 
jgislati u e has all ead) r incoi poi ated a tolling prnod foi cei tain 
causes of actions. 
Plaintiff erroneously argues that the equitable discovery/tolling rule applies to 
claims under U.C.A. § 78-12-21.5. All versions of the statute that might potentially apply 
to this case, however, contain specific language that tolls the filing period until discovery 
specifically removes the maximal filing period limit in cases where a provider (1) has 
fraudulently concealed ...... r 
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intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty. 
The only interesting point of distinction is that in all versions after 1991, actions 
for breach of contract or warranty are distinguished from other causes of action and are 
specifically required to be filed within six years of the completion of the improvement or 
abandonment of construction (unless otherwise provided for by express warranty or 
contract). 
The statute, in all variations, speaks for itself The Legislature has already 
considered the tolling issue and embodied such considerations into the statute itself. The 
Legislature has affirmatively left out any equitable discovery/tolling rule from the 
contract/warranty component of the statute in all versions after 1991. If the Court did, in 
fact, apply the 1999 version of the statute, Plaintiffs Breach of Contract claim was 
clearly barred (inasmuch as it was not filed within six years from the date of completion 
of construction). However, the same question arises: if Plaintiff s claims accrued in 
1994, then which version of the statute should apply? 
2. Even if equitable tolling should be applied, the tolling period is 
still is dependent upon the accrual date. 
Before a trial court may properly apply the discovery rule to extend a statute of 
limitations period, "an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know or and 
could not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a 
claim." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). In fact, the entire 
purpose of the discovery rule is to unsure that an applicable statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until a party knows or should have known of the existence of a particular 
8 
cause of action. Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 
the running of the limitation period 'until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the 
cause of action. , ,..^. .n». citaikus onniteu). 
V"Vitliout a specific determination as to the date on which Plaintiff and her husband 
discovered or should have discovered the facts for forming the basis of their causes of 
in l i i i i i |hr l i i ill ml ! (iiiilliill iiiiiill \\\]\ v i ippli i ill linn i l i s n n r n iiiilii1 ^ iilii ml i nmmi l l im ' 
reversible error. 
in this case, iiiw .ii^coverv .L..-. a. JIIOHCOL -^pncuneLdUH ; ,.rt 
found that 35 of the defects were "patent" and therefore discoverable through a home 
inspection prior to the purchase of the home. This is particularly significant, given that 
'••*»"< * •• • ' ' •• *^  ••-','1 "" "I1 -• -.i.^ i^MiK i^t J;onio inspection 
in 2000. In other words, even if Plaintiff was entitled to invoke the doctrine of equitable 
equitable tolling would terminate at the time she could have discovered both patent and 
latent defects (i.e. via a home inspection piiui u> mc purchase of the home). Because no 
.accrual date was ever precisely'determined, there is no way of knowing when Plaintiff's 
equitable tolling period ended. 
Till': liiiii r T R i N f in I i l l i ill,i rurroit \vv\ IFSINTIIISCASE. 
As set forth in Defendants' initial Brief (pp. 32-25), the doctrine of caveat emptor 
as elucidated by Utah courts appiu> ^ .,u iaUh m ti;;.-. case and bars Piaini _ ^ ; ; ,-. 
Contract and other tort claims. 
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Plaintiffs were aware that they were buying the home in an "as is" condition, and 
that the EMSA disclaimed all warranties and representations other than those found in 
paragraph "C". The alleged defects were ultimately discovered by a non-destructive 
inspection in 2000, and could have been discovered in similar fashion before the sale of 
the home in 1994. Governing case law clearly establishes that Plaintiffs had a 
responsibility to protect themselves by having the home inspected before the sale. 
Plaintiffs did not have the home inspected before the sale; instead Plaintiffs failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence, waiting until August, 2000 (over six years after purchasing 
the home) to have it inspected. Paragraph "B" of the EMSA itself specifically provides: 
Tf B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that 
Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and 
judgement and not by reason of any representation made to Buyer by 
Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, 
location, present value, future value, income here from or as to its 
production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to 
Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event that Buyer 
desires an additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by 
Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs were clearly given every opportunity to perform their due diligence and 
were put on notice of the home's status by the language of the EMSA. Plaintiffs did not 
exercise ordinary due diligence to discover the alleged defects and, therefore, the doctrine 
of caveat emptor precludes Plaintiffs from bringing suit for the alleged defects in the 
home. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY SUBMITTED QUESTIONS OF 
LAW TO THE JURY. 
The trial court's special verdict questions to the jury as to whether "the statute of 
10 
limitations barred or prohibited the Plaintiffs fraudulent non-disclosure claim" to the 
dofr 
erred not only in posing a legal question to the jury, but also erred in accepting the ruling 
baset . - ie.-*p*>i;>c iv UIL ^U-. 
If, indeed, Plaintiff was required to file her Breach of Contract claim within six 
years from the date of closing (as indicated by Jury Instruction . - uic jury 
completely erred in gi anting judgment for Plaintiff; »n h/r Breach of Contract claim since 
it is undisputed that the claim was filed more than six years after closing. As discussed in 
to any other tort claims under U.C.A. £ 7K-12-21.5 because a tolling period is 
incorporated in the statute's very language). 
Similarly, thejury's legal conclusion that Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure 
claims as to the windows and footings were not barred by the statute of limitations is 
1994. 
I ' " FHE TRIAL COURT DID NO! ERR IN GRANTING PAR i iAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PI AINTIFF'S FRAUD! 1 ,FNT 
NONDISCLOSURE CLAIM. 
On appeal, a trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. 
• i'i<-*l f - "• ; * * .' ir. \\i ' l l *•.--,*. neainst whom the 
motion was granted. See Anderson \>. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, f 10, 108 P.3d 701. 
1 This jury instruction is apparently is based oi: ..i. *•• * rr^nn^, i .:i*_ >taun.e. 
11 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record even though that ground 
or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling. Boud v. SDNCO, 
Inc., 2002 UT 83, If 10, 54 P.3d 1131, (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 
(Utah 1998)). 
As argued in the first three Sections of this brief and as set forth in Defendants' 
brief-in-chief, Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclsoure claim (as well as her other claims) is 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by the doctrine of caveat emptor. In 
other words, the partial dismissal of Plaintiff s Fraudulent Nondisclsoure claim as to 37 of 
the 42 alleged defects was appropriate on statute of limitations and/or caveat emptor 
theories in any case, and should be upheld. 
Irrespective, the trial court correctly ruled in its Memorandum Decision on 
Defendants' second Motion for Summary Judgment (filed August 21, 2003) [and attached 
hereto as Addendum "1"] that: (1) all but five of the alleged defects were patent, (2) that 
the Defendants' home was "used," and (3) that the doctrine of caveat emptor precluded 
Plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure claims as to 37 of the 42 alleged defects. 
Furthermore, the trial court did not "invade the province of the jury" as alleged by 
Plaintiff in granting summary judgment as to defects No. 12 and 38. Finally, the Utah 
Supreme Court has not abandoned the doctrine of caveat emptor as asserted by Plaintiff. 
A. The ruling of the trial court that all but five of the alleged defects were 
patent, and thus disposable through Defendants' summary judgment 
motion, was correct. 
Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
Defendants' favor on her fraudulent nondisclosure claim as related to 37 of the 42 alleged 
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defects in the home. 
26, 27, 28, and 39 of the original 42 defects in the home were in fact not "latent''' or were 
Hi . , . I i i U U C I i ^ l l U i ; ^ d U v i v U i \ -v ' ,.• .= *" ' i , ' ! " ' - JM' •• : , ^ K 
that she was somehow compelled or forced to admit that 35 of the defects were "patent." 
However, as discussed hereinafter, Plaintiff answered me requests for admissions in 
uurstion Owl • i -v:4U-r compulsion. 
:r Defendants tiled their Second Set of Requests for Admissions on October 9, 
2()().z . . xcn requL^-* . . .*• o! \auuene^ ,'1!'' f>^  <• * *f it 
certain requests required Plaintiff to posit a legal conclusion. (R. 527-530). A review of 
Defendants' Second Set of Requests for Admissions rexcais u-.ai i^ cienuaiiLs asKcu, 
among other things (11 whether each of the alleged 42 defects had actually been 
discovered through inspection by a knowledgeable inspector and whether such discovery 
time could have revealed each of the 42 alleged defects. (3) whether each of the 42 
defects were "laten i . ^ .., •K..IU J.U I < . u a - i*,a^i.ai." 
After an extension was allowed for Plaintiff, and after several requests by 
Defendants that Plaintiff submit answers to the Second Set of Requests for Admissions, 
Defendants filed a Motion v,- Sanctions, or in the Alternative to Compel Discovery. (R. 
390). 
the potential application of the statute of limitations and caveat emptor defenses to the 
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case and also given that the EMS A itself disclaimed all warranties other than those listed 
in paragraph "C." 
The trial court ultimately required Plaintiff to answer. While Plaintiff correctly 
notes that the trial court defined "latent" as "hidden," Plaintiff was not forced by the trial 
court to admit anything. In fact, if Plaintiff could have simply denied that any or all of 
the alleged defects were patent. 
Plaintiffs reliance on case law and Black's Law Dictionary does not necessarily 
prove that the trial court's definition of the term "latent" was incorrect or misleading. 
Plaintiffs own reference to Hot v. University of Utah, 2000 UT App 286, 12 P.3d 1011 is 
illustrative. In that case, this Court quoted Black's Law Dictionary in defining a "latent 
defect" as "a defect which reasonably careful inspection will not reveal." Id. at f 18. 
Although this definition is somewhat more specific than the definition provided by the 
trial court ("hidden"), the two definitions are closely synonymous. More importantly, if 
Plaintiff had reservations about the trial court's definition and wished to rely upon 
Black's Law Dictionary as the standard definition for the terms "patent" and "latent," she 
could have simply denied that any of the alleged defects were "patent." 
On appeal, Plaintiff asks this Court to probe her internal subjective reasoning 
concerning her understanding of the term "latent" at the time she answered the requests 
and then to find that she was somehow misled by the trial court into admitting that 35 of 
the defects were not "latent." 
In the instant case, Plaintiff and her husband purchased an inexpensive home 
for $83,000.00. Plaintiffs opted not to have an inspection done even though the 
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E M S A itself was rife with disclaimers as to warrant ies . 
been discoverable in 1994 irrespective of whether the defects were patent or latent if an 
inspect ion had been obtained. ., important!} , r ^ n u m OIICIN AA ^ : \AW„ AA,A a m 
of 35 defects that she admit ted were "patent" were , in fact, "unobservable upon 
reasonable inspect ion." Plaintiff m a d e an admiss ion as to the status of the a l leged defects 
.imitl f i r (n.il I *i<L;11'HI I »i|t[Mo[i>nal,i l> n jwiintin^ Miiiiiiiar\ itidgnietif \ Iliosr admit tedly 
patent defects. The trial cour t ' s definition of "latent" as being synonymous wi th "h idden" 
is not so divergent from the Blacr : . ^A\\\A\\^ - ..( • IOI I: I lainti f! 's 
allegation that she was misled into mistaken admissions. 
B The trial court did not "invade the province of the jury'5 in granting 
summary judgment as to defects No. 12 and 38. 
In addition to the 35 admittedly patent defects, the trial court granted summary 
judgment as to defects No. 12 and 38. I he trial court: explained its rationale in the August 
21, 2003 Memorandum Decision on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
as follows: 
Additionally, the Court finds that the alleged defect item number 12, "no 
smoke detectors in the bedrooms and the only smoke detector in the house is a 
battery detector" to be an item that could have reasonably been discovered by 
Plaintiffs. Likewise, alleged defect Item number 38 "insulation baffles to 
allow ventilation at exterior walls" is an item that could have reasonably been 
discovered by the Plaintiffs by observing there were not vents on the House in 
the roof area. [See Addendum " l , " p . 6]. 
The trial court assessed that these two alleged defects were so reasonably 
discouTiibli In, ll.'iitililViiiHl liri li I i Ill il iiiiin n,ii\ imli'iiuiil ^ .n >\ .iiTiinfril II 
trial court had been fully briefed on all of the facts prior to rendering its decision and 
believed that this was a "clear case" in which summary judgment was appropriate. Hot at 
1fl8. 
C. The trial court properly concluded that the Defendants' home was 
"used." 
Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court's reasonable conclusion that the 
Defendants were selling a "used" home. In the August 215 2003 Memorandum Decision 
on Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court cited Schafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah App. 1994) as the standard for determining whether 
the doctrine of caveat emptor could be invoked by Defendants. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 4]. 
The court then explained why Defendants' home was deemed "used:" 
"[a] home inspection is not required when purchasing a new home because the 
doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply. In this case, Plaintiffs did not 
dispute that the Smiths lived in the Home or that the Smiths intended it to be 
their home in their response to Defendants' first Motion for Summary 
Judgment, therefore, it is an admission. The Court finds that the Home is a 
used home because the Smiths intended it to be their home, they lived in the 
Home for a short period of time, and Plaintiffs have admitted these facts. . 
[Addendum " 1 , " pp. 4-5]. 
On appeal, Plaintiff attempts to persuade this Court that the home was not 
"used"—this despite the undisputed fact that Defendants' lived in the home for a 
period before selling it to Plaintiff and her husband.^ In an effort to create its own 
legal definition of the term "used," Plaintiff postulates that because Defendants 
only lived in the home for three weeks after the certificate of occupancy was 
issued, the home should not have been considered "used." 
2 Even Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants lived in the home for a period before 
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Plaintiff also argues that Defendants' never claimed that the home was "used." 
[See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 33]. This assertion is absurd. Defendants and the trial court 
obviously understood the common and generally accepted definition of the term "used" 
given the context of this case. It is not necessary or remotely feasible for parties in 
litigation to minutely define and claim ownership of a term when the facts sufficiently 
provide a basis for a commonsense understanding of the term. Plaintiff is straining at 
gnats. 
A lengthy argument is made by Plaintiff that the trial court unfairly held Plaintiff 
to a prior admission that Defendants built the home "for their own residence." [See 
Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 31-32]. Plaintiff admits that she and her husband did not originally 
contest Defendants' assertion that the home had been build for Defendants' residence. 
[See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 31]. Nevertheless, Plaintiff explains that this admission was only 
made in the context of the first summary judgment motion filed by Defendants in 
February 2001. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 31]. After two years had elapsed, Plaintiff 
apparently changed her mind for purposes of Defendants' second Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on May 6, 2003. In Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff and her husband denied that Defendants built the home for 
their own residence. (R. 958). Plaintiff made no motion, oral or written, to formally 
withdraw her prior admission that Defendants had built the home for their residence. 
Furthermore, in the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiff relied upon her own deposition testimony in attempting to refute 
selling it. [See Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 30-31]. 
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Defendants' contention that the home was built for their own residence. The problem is 
that Plaintiff is merely offering her opinion as to Defendants" subjective intentions. How 
do Plaintiff and Mr. Peterson know what the intentions of Defendants were in 
constructing the home? Defendants dissect this problem in their Reply Memorandum in 
support of summary judgment. [See Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 1-2, attached hereto as Addendum "2"]. 
Finally, Plaintiff warns that if this Court does not reverse the trial court's 
categorization of the home as "used," then "it may become a customary habit for some 
general contractors to live in a home a few short weeks and then sell it to an unsuspecting 
buyer who thinks he is buying a "new" home, when in-fact, he may be buying a "used" 
home in which the doctrine of caveat emptor applies." [See Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 31-32]. 
This is pure conjecture. More problematic, however, is that Plaintiff offers no clear-cut 
alternative for trial courts who are attempting to determine whether a home is "used" or 
not. Should this Court actually reverse the trial court, what standard should be imposed 
for determining whether a home is "used?" Should a home be considered "used" if a 
person lives in it for one month? Two months? Should the subjective intent of the 
builder/owner be dispositive? Should other extrinsic questions of fact be explored (such 
as whether the home was listed)? 
In sum, the trial court's determination that the home was "used" was reasonable 
and well-founded. The trial court relied upon a common understanding of the term and 
upon the clear undisputed facts of the case. Plaintiffs revocation of her admission that 
the home was intended by Defendants to be their residence (even if proper) is based only 
18 
on her subjective opinion. Reversal of the trial court's determination on this issue is 
unwarranted. 
D. The trial court's application of the doctrine of caveat emptor in this case 
was proper. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that Maack v. Resource Design & Const, Inc., 875 P.2d 
570 (Utah App.,1994) and Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App., 1994) remain 
governing law in Utah on the application of the doctrine of caveat emptor. Defendants 
have previously analyzed these two case along with Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, \ 
24, 48 P.3d 235 and applied the rulings in those cases to the present case. [See 
Defendants' Brief, pp. 32-34]. 
The following undisputed facts are also relevant [see Defendants' Brief, pp. 6-7]: 
1. An Earnest Money Sales Agreement ("EMSA") was executed between 
Defendants and Plaintiffs on February 15, 1994 for the sale of the Home. 
2. The relevant provisions of the EMSA for purposes of this appeal are: 
\l(e) Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property subject to 
Section 1(c) above and 6 below, accepts in its present physical condition, 
except: (BLANK) 
\ 6. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in 
Section C, the following 
% B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is 
purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgement 
and not by reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the 
Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present 
value, future value, income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts 
the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in 
Section 6. In the event that Buyer desires an additional inspection, said 
inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
% C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received 
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no claim or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the 
property which has not or which will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) 
all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, 
mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall be brought 
current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances 
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing. 
3. Plaintiffs walked through the Home on February 11, 1994 before executing 
the EMSA on February 15, 1994. 
4. Defendants read the "as is'Vno warranties clauses with Plaintiffs at the time 
the EMSA was executed by both parties. 
Despite the obvious disclaimers made by Defendants against any warranty other 
those outlined in ^ f C, despite the fact that Plaintiff and her husband agreed that they were 
buying the home "as is," and despite the fact that Plaintiff could have obtained a home 
inspection, Plaintiff chose to purchase the home without conducting any inspection. 
The language of this Court in the Schafir decision bears repeating: 
The responsibility to observe patent, and any discoverable latent, defects falls 
on the buyer of the home and is usually accomplished by hiring a 
knowledgeable home inspector to scrutinize the home before finalizing a sale. 
Oftentimes, however, real estate agents and sellers are understandably unaware 
of latent defects in the home at the time of sale. This is an inherent risk 
involved in purchasing a home. Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1390 (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
Generally, absent some express agreement between the parties—which is 
absent here—the doctrine of caveat emptor precludes a home buyer from 
bringing suit for discoverable defects in the home. Especially when the sale of 
a used home is involved, the purchaser is on notice that the residence is not 
new and may contain defects affecting the home's quality or condition. Id. at 
n.12. 
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It is noteworthy that in the foregoing quote, this Court associates "patent" defects 
as those that are observable and "latent" defects as "discoverable." Irrespective, this 
Court correctly notes both patent and latent defects are typically "discoverable" through 
the process of home inspection. 
Another important aspect of this case that should not be overlooked is the fact that 
the EMS A itself provided notice that the Plaintiffs were purchasing the home "as is" 
without any reliance upon any representations of Defendants. The EMS A also indicates 
that the buyers had conducted an inspection of their own and that they were entitled to 
obtain a further professional inspection. All of these contractual "red flags" were placed 
squarely within the purview of the Plaintiffs at the time they were considering purchasing 
the home. In other words, Plaintiffs were doubly informed of their rights and potential 
risks in this case. Even if the doctrine of caveat emptor was inapplicable, the trial court's 
decision to grant summary judgment was still reasonable given the disclaimers in the 
EMSA. 
Plaintiff suggests that the Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, decision 
has created new judicial law imposing an implied warranty of habitability on all sales of 
residential homes. In Smith v. Frandsen, the developer of a subdivision sold partially 
developed property to a builder-contractor, who in turn sold the property to another 
contractor-builder who then constructed a home. The new home was purchased by the 
Smiths. The central question in the case was whether the remote developer could be 
liable to homeowners for damages caused to the home as a result of unstable soil. The 
focus in Smith v. Frandsen was not on whether the relationship between the Smiths and 
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their builder-contractor imposed a legal duty to disclose information about soil 
conditions. The builder-contractor was not a party to the lawsuit. The inquiry into the 
builder-contractor's role was, instead, directed at whether parity existed between what the 
builder-contractor knew about the condition of the soil that lay beneath the Smiths' house 
and the developer's knowledge of the same soil instability. 
Ultimately, the Smith v. Frandsen court found that the Smiths could not recover 
from the developer because duty to disclose material information is extinguished once the 
information is communicated or otherwise acquired by the party (in this case, the 
builder-contractors) to whom the duty was first owed. Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, % 
17. 
Plaintiff emphasizes with bold lettering certain language from the Smith v. 
Frandsen in support of its proposition that the doctrine of caveat emptor has been 
abandoned in Utah. [See Plaintiffs Brief, pp. 34-35]. Yet, all of the language in that 
quote is culled from other jurisdictions. The Smith v. Frandsen case was not directly 
concerned with application of the doctrine of caveat emptor as between a home-builder 
and a purchaser (as recognized in the concurring opinion of Justice Wilkins and Justice 
Durrant). Moreover, the decision was rendered in 2004—well after the trial court issued 
its Memorandum Decision on Defendants' second Motion for Summary Judgment in 
August, 2003. 
The trial court properly applied the doctrine of caveat emptor in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on 35 of the 42 alleged defects as to Plaintiffs 
Fraudulent Nondisclosure Claim. The ruling of the trial court on this matter should be 
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affirmed. 
V, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CLAIM. 
On appeal, a trial court's grant of summary judgment, is reviewed for correctness. 
All undisputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 
motion was granted. See Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ^ flO, 108 P.3d 701. 
However, the reviewing court may affirm the result reached by the trial court "if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record even though that ground 
or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling. Boud v. SDNCO, 
Inc., 2002 UT 83, ^ 10, 54 P.3d 1131, (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 
(Utah 1998)). 
As argued in the preceding sections of this brief and as set forth in Defendants' 
brief-in-chief, Plaintiffs entire Breach of Contract claim (as well as her other claims) is 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by the doctrine of caveat emptor. In 
other words, the partial dismissal of Plaintiff s Breach of Contract claim as to all alleged 
defects except for the finish grading issue (R. 1749) by the trial court was appropriate on 
statute of limitations and/or caveat emptor theories in any case, and should be upheld. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Defendants will address the substance of Plaintiff s 
argument that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants as to the Breach of Contract claim. 
The essence of Plaintiff s argument is whether paragraph "C" of the EMS A was 
properly interpreted by the trial court. Specifically, the issue raised is whether Defendant 
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Dan Smith received any claim or notice of zoning violation concerning the property. As 
noted by Plaintiff, paragraph "C" of the EMS A contains the only warranties made by the 
Defendants—the EMS A expressly disclaims all other warranties and/or representations. 
Paragraph "C" provides:" 
f C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has 
received no claim or notice of any building or zoning violation 
concerning the property which has not or which will not be remedied 
prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, 
assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature 
shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and 
appliances shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at 
closing. 
Defendants brought a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Breach of Contract claims. (R. 
1377). Defendants argued that the EMS A itself contains a disclaimer of all warranties 
and iterates the "as is" status of the home, except for those warranties contained in 
paragraph "C." Defendants also noted that there was no evidence that the HVAC 
(heating, air-conditioning, ventilating system) was inoperable at the time of closing. Nor 
was there any evidence that the electrical systems, plumbing or appliances were not in 
proper working condition at the time of closing. Plaintiff and her husband had used these 
systems for over six years without complaint. 
Plaintiff admitted that paragraph "C" was the only warranty given upon which she 
could base a breach of contract claim. (R. 1528). Plaintiff s primary argument (which is 
reasserted on appeal) is that "notice" of any zoning violation should be imputed to 
Defendant Dan Smith because he was a licensed contractor and built the home. 
Defendants have already responded to this position in their Reply Memorandum in 
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Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract Claims 
[attached hereto as Addendum "3"]. 
Defendants reassert those same arguments as set forth in the Reply Memorandum, 
namely: (1) that building inspector, Jack Peterson, performed a complete inspection, 
finding no violations other than the incomplete grading, and issued a certificate of 
occupancy, (2) a deviation from the applicable building code is not equivalent to a 
"violation," (3) the building inspector should legally be the final authority as to whether a 
"violation" exists or not—and in this case Jack Peterson issued the certificate of 
occupancy, thereby approving the home as compliant with applicable building code 
sections, (4) Paragraph "C" clearly states that the seller must not "receive" any claim or 
notice of any building or zoning violation. It is undisputed that Defendants did not 
"receive" any claim or notice of any building or zoning violation, (5) the applicable code 
sections allow for some deviation. 
Plaintiff tries to impose a specific definition of the term "notice" to the facts in this 
case. However, when read in the context of paragraph "C," it is clear that Plaintiffs 
multi-definitional version of the word "notice" is not what was intended. Plaintiff should 
not be allowed to redefine the plain meaning of the term as it is used in the EMS A. 
Plaintiff also briefly mentions that the attic ventilation system was not in proper 
working order at the time of closing. Obviously, the trial court and the record prove 
otherwise, and Plaintiff has not marshaled any evidence to support its contention. The 
trial court was entirely justified in granting summary judgment as to the attic ventilation 
system based on the evidence before it. 
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The trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs Breach of Contract claims as to 
all alleged defects other than the grading. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM. 
On appeal, a trial court's grant of summary judgment, is reviewed for correctness. 
All undisputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 
motion was granted. See Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, ^ [10, 108 P.3d 701. 
However, the reviewing court may affirm the result reached by the trial court "if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record even though that ground 
or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling. Boud v. SDNCO, 
Inc., 2002 UT 83, Tf 10, 54 P.3d 1131, (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 
(Utah 1998)). 
Plaintiff seeks review of the trial court's Order on Defendants' first Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In that Order, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs claim for 
Negligent Misrepresentation on the basis that the claim was barred by the doctrine of 
merger. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 39]. 
As with the two preceding Sections of this brief, Defendants assert that 
Plaintiffs Negligent Misrepresentation claim is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations and by the doctrine oi caveat emptor. Thus, the subsidiary issue of whether 
the Negligent Misrepresentation claim was properly dismissed because of the merger 
doctrine becomes irrelevant. 
Furthermore, even if this Court finds that the trial court erred in dismissing 
26 
Plaintiffs Negligent Misrepresentation claim, Plaintiff has also brought a claim for 
Fraudulent Nondisclosure (which she prevailed on at trial). Plaintiff would not be entitled 
to double recovery even if both claims were allowed and she prevailed on both claims. 
Defendants otherwise do not contest the analysis of the issue of the doctrine of 
merger set forth in Plaintiffs Brief (pp. 39-42). Because Defendants agree with 
Plaintiffs analysis of the doctrine of merger, Defendants need not address whether the 
collateral rights exception analysis presented by Plaintiff is accurate. Again, however, 
Defendants assert that dismissal of the Negligent Misrepresentation claim was proper 
because the claim was brought outside the statute of limitations period and/or because the 
claim is barred by the doctrine of caveat emptor. 
VII. THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE MAJORITY RULE AND FIND 
THAT RULE 26(b)(4)(C) DOES NOT PERMIT RECOVERY FOR AN 
EXPERT'S TIME IN PREPARING FOR DEPOSITION. 
Plaintiff claims that she should be compensated for her experts' time in preparing 
for deposition. [See Plaintiffs Brief, pg 44]. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
that "the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable 
fee for time spent in responding to discovery." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i). This 
statute is not ambiguous. It states that where one party deposes the opposing party's 
expert, the deposing party is responsible to pay the expert "a reasonable fee" for the time 
spent at the deposition. Id. 
It has never been the customary practice in Utah for one party to pay the other 
party's expert for the time that expert spends preparing for a deposition. Indeed, it is the 
customary practice for the deposing attorney to pay only for the expert's time during the 
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deposition. This custom is in harmony with the vast majority of federal courts 
interpreting the identical federal discovery provision of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. An Illinois federal court succinctly stated the majority rule regarding payment 
of expert witness preparation time, holding that "[i]t should normally be the case.. .that 
Rule 26(b)(4)(C) does not permit recovery for time spent "preparing for a deposition." 
Sears v. EEOC, 138 F.R.D. 523 (N.D. 111. 1991). See also S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee 
Metropolitan Sewerage District, 154 F.R.D. 212, 214 (E.D.Wis. 1994); Cotton v. 
Consolidation Coal Co., 457 F.2d 641, 546-47 (6th Cir. 1972); Herbst v. Int'l Telephone 
& Telegraph Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 531 (D. Conn. 1975); and McBrian v. Liebert Corp., 
173 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ill 1997). The majority of federal courts uphold this rule because, 
"[o]ne party need not pay for the other's trial preparation. Rhee v. Witco, 126 F.R.D. 45 
(D. Kan. 2002). 
It would be inequitable to require Defendants to pay for the dubiously lengthy 
preparation time of Plaintiff s expert witnesses. Indeed, to adopt the rule as proposed by 
Plaintiff would provide an incentive for plaintiffs to educate themselves and prepare for 
trial at the expense of the party deposing their expert. Where a plaintiff is the one to 
bring suit, the plaintiff should be required to pay for the cost of their own prosecution. 
Otherwise, the defendant will in effect pay a substantial amount of the plaintiffs trial 
preparation costs and plaintiffs' counsel's education. 
Some of the federal courts in the majority do find an exception to the general rule 
prohibiting the recovery for time spent by experts preparing for their depositions. 
However, this exception does not apply to this case because the exception is limited to 
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"complex cases where there has been a considerable lapse of time between an expert's 
work on a case and the date of his actual deposition. S. A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee 
Metropolitan Sewerage District, 154 F.R.D. 212, 214 (E.D. Wis. 1994). Here, a 
considerable amount of time had not lapsed between the work of the Plaintiffs experts 
and their depositions, and what time had passed was due to Plaintiffs failure over a 
period of seven months to properly respond to discovery requests regarding her expert 
witnesses. Moreover, this is not a complex case. See Rhee, 126 F.R.D. at 45 (single 
plaintiff and one single defendant is not a complex case). Therefore, Defendants 
respectfully request that the Court follow the majority rule and establish that 
"normally.. .Rule 26(b)(4)(C) does not permit recovery for time spent "preparing for a 
deposition." Sears, 138 F.R.D. 523. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES WHERE THE COURT'S AWARD OF 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES WAS PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
Plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that she was only entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs on her Breach of Contract cause of action. [See Plaintiff Brief, 
pp. 49]. Plaintiff further argues that the language found in the attorney's fees clause of 
the EMSA exempted her from having to designate her fees based on successful and 
unsuccessful claims as required by Utah law. [Id.] Alternatively, Plaintiff claims that 
even if she was required to designate her fees, she fulfilled this requirement because "the 
causes of action were so closely related and intertwined as to be indistinguishable." [Id., 
p. 50]. 
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Proceedings below. On or about April 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed a verified Motion 
for Attorney's Fees and Costs asking the court to award her $120,645.88 in attorney fees 
and $35,131.53 in costs for a total of $155,777.41. (R. 2148). Defendants filed 
objections to the motion, arguing that Plaintiffs only right to fees and costs arose under 
paragraph "N" of the EMS A and that, therefore, Plaintiff was only entitled to recover fees 
incurred in bringing her Breach of Contract claim. (R. 2188). Defendants further noted 
that the Plaintiff had failed to designate the fees attributable to unsuccessful claims as 
opposed to successful claims as required by Utah law and therefore Plaintiffs request for 
attorney fees and costs should be denied. 
At a hearing on the issue, the court ruled that under Utah law, Plaintiff was only 
entitled to recover attorney fees and costs where she had a contractual right to them and 
that in this case a contractual right only arose from the Breach of Contract claim under the 
EMS A. [R. Transcript hearing on Motions June 6, 2005, pp. 45-46]. In conformance 
with this ruling, the trial court ordered that Plaintiff "review [her] proposed billing and 
submit a new billing with those fees associated with pursuing the breach of contract claim 
that [they] were successful on." [Id., p. 71]. 
On June 20, 2005, Plaintiff submitted her amended billing to the court. [See 
Response to Court's Directive Regarding Attorney's Fees, Costs and Expenses, attached 
hereto as Addendum "4"]. According to the amended billing, Plaintiffs claim for 
attorney fees increased from their original claim of $155,777.41 to $158,927.72. This 
increase reflected an additional $6,717.00 in attorney's fees accrued since the last motion 
and a reduction of the original claim for attorney's fees in the amount of $3,822.24 in 
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response to the Court's directive. In its order awarding attorney fees, the court noted that 
"[i]n the Court's opinion Plaintiffs attorney made no real effort to comply with the 
Court's directive to submit a claim for attorney's fees and costs associated with the 
successful breach of contract claim." [See Plaintiffs Brief, Addendum No. "10," pp. 2-3]. 
The Court also concluded that because Plaintiff "failed to provide any factual basis 
upon which the Court can determine the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs claim for 
attorney's fees and costs, the Court will have to make its own evaluation of the request 
based upon its knowledge of the case and evaluation of the claimed fees and costs and the 
Court's experience and knowledge of attorney's fees in similar cases." [Id.] The court 
then reviewed Plaintiffs request for attorney fees based on the factors set out in Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) and ultimately determined that it was 
reasonable for Plaintiff to be awarded attorney fees in the amount of $40,000 and costs in 
the amount of $10,000. [Id., pp. 3-5]. 
Standards of review. Whether Plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney fees and 
costs under the EMS A is a question of law which the court will review for correctness. 
Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah App. 1996). However, the determination 
of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees and costs "is in the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and will not be overturned absent the showing of a clear abuse of discretion." 
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988 (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has noted, 
"[b]ecause the trial court is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the quality 
and efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the litigation, we have 
endowed the trial courts with discretion to assess the reasonableness of the fees requested 
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under a contract or statute." Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1998). 
A. The trial court correctly found that Plaintiff was only entitled to 
recover the fees arising from the Breach of Contract claim. 
Plaintiff is only entitled to recover her attorney fees and costs incurred in pursuit of 
the breach of contract claim. In Utah, attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable 
only in accordance with the explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted 
by the contract. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc. 645 P.2d 667, 671 
(Utah 1982); Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah 
App. 1989). Furthermore, parties seeking an award of attorney fees under a contract must 
establish that the contract's terms anticipate such an award. Maynard v. Wharton, 9Y1 
P.2d 446 (Utah App. 1996). 
Plaintiffs claim for attorney fees and costs arises under Paragraph "N" of the 
"EMSA". Paragraph "N" provides, in pertinent part: 
Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or 
agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy 
provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by 
filing suit or otherwise. 
Plaintiff argues that under this clause, she is entitled to recover all attorney fees 
incurred in pursuit of all six of her causes of action, not just those fees arising from her 
breach of contract action. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 47]. 
This issue on appeal is governed by the case of Foote v. Clark, in which the Utah 
Supreme Court examined an award of attorney fees based on a clause virtually identical 
to the one at issue. See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998). 
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In Foote v. Clark, the parties entered into a standard real estate purchase contract 
for the sale of a home. The attorney fee provision in the real estate purchase contract 
stated: 
Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or 
agreements contained herein, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy 
provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by 
filing suit or otherwise. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 54. 
This provision is virtually identical to the attorney fee provision contained in 
Paragraph "N" of the EMS A. Later, when the parties were unable to agree as to certain 
of the contract's provisions, defendant sold the home to a third party. Plaintiff brought a 
suit for breach of contract against defendant, and a suit for tortuous interference with the 
contract against defendant's real estate agent and brokers. At trial, the court found that 
although defendant had breached the contract, plaintiff had suffered no actual harm and 
therefore was only entitled to minimal damages. The court also ruled that pursuant to the 
attorney fee provision of the contract, plaintiff was entitled to recover all of its attorney 
fees and costs from defendant, even those expended in pursuing claims against 
defendant's agents. 
On appeal, defendant argued that a plaintiff who only recovers nominal damages is 
not considered "successful" under Utah law, and therefore is not entitled to attorney fees 
under a "prevailing party" statute. See Fashion Place Associates v. Glad Rags, Inc., 754 
P.2d 940, 942 (Utah 1988) (holding that a party who recovers only nominal damages is 
not "successful" where the attorney fees contract clause provided that "the unsuccessful 
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party in such action or proceeding agrees to reimburse the successful party for the 
reasonable expense of attorney fees..."). The Supreme Court rejected this argument and 
found that "[t]he amount of plaintiffs' recovery in this case is irrelevant under the 
language of the contract." Id. at 54. "Rather, the sole criterion for the plaintiff to obtain 
attorney fees in a remedial action pursuant to this contract is to show a default by the 
other contract party." Id. The Court noted, however, that "[t]he contract only authorizes 
fees to be collected for time expended in remedying a default in the purchase agreement." 
Id. at 55. 
B. Under paragraph "N" of the EMS A, a party may only recover attorney 
fees incurred in enforcing the agreement if it can prove the other party 
defaulted on the Agreement. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in ruling that she could not recover 
attorney fees and costs on all of their causes of action. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 47]. 
Plaintiff bases this claim on the assertion that Paragraph "N" of the EMS A "requires that 
that [sic] the defaulting party., .pay all costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fee." 
[See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 49]. Plaintiff further argues that "[j]ust because Plaintiffs basis 
for recovery was found in a contract, does not necessarily mean that she could only 
recover for breach of that contract." [Id., p. 50] 
These arguments misconstrue the law in Foote v. Clark. As noted by the Court, 
the contract, or EMSA, "only authorizes fees to be collected for time expended in 
remedying a default in the purchase agreement." Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. Plaintiff points 
out that Defendants' default in the EMSA arose from their breach of Paragraph C(a) of 
the EMSA with respect to the violation of the building code for improper grading. [See 
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Plaintiffs Brief, pg. 48] Therefore, under Foote v. Clark, Plaintiff is only authorized to 
collect fees for time spent remedying the default, or in other words, the time spent 
remedying the breach of contract claim respecting the violation of the building code for 
improper grading. 
Plaintiff is correct in arguing that paragraph "N" does not require there to be a 
successful or prevailing party in order for attorney's fees to be awarded. Rather, all a 
plaintiff must do in order to recover attorney fees under paragraph "N" is prove that the 
defendant defaulted under the contract. A plaintiff has proven there is a default only when 
the court or jury makes a finding of fact that the defendant breached, or defaulted, on the 
contract. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it limited Plaintiffs recovery of 
attorney fees to the portion of the breach of contract claim they were successful on. 
C. The trial court's evaluation of reasonable attorney fees was properly 
supported by its findings of fact. 
On appeal, Plaintiff argues "that the trial court erred in arbitrarily reducing 
Plaintiffs attorney fees and costs without support in its Findings of Fact." [See Plaintiffs 
Brief, p. 53]. 
It is well established that "An award of attorney fees must be based on evidence 
and supported by findings of fact." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 
(Utah 1992). Therefore, "[the] party who requests an award of attorney fees has the 
burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support an award." Id. For this reason, the 
courts have required that one who seeks a reward must set out the time and fees expended 
for: 
(1) Successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, 
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(2) Unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to 
attorney fees had the claims been successful, and 
(3) Claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees. Id, 
After a party has submitted sufficient evidence supporting the request of an award, 
the trial court must then make its own independent determination of the reasonableness 
of the requested fees in light of that parties' evidence. Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. However, 
while ultimately "a trial court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether for [the 
requesting party's] failure to allocate, it may not award wholesale all attorney fees 
requested if they have not been allocated as to separate claims and/or parties." Foote, 
962 P.2d at 57. 
On April 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion and supporting memorandum requesting 
an award of attorney fees. (R. 2148). The trial court found the evidence in the 
supporting memorandum insufficient, however, because it failed to allocate fees between 
successful and unsuccessful claims. In an attempt to remedy this insufficiency, the court 
ordered Plaintiff to "review [her] proposed billing and submit a new billing with those 
fees associated with pursuing the breach of contract claim that she was successful on." 
[R. Transcript hearing on Motions June 6, 2005, p. 71]. In spite of the court's direct 
order, Plaintiffs response to the court's directive contained only minor modifications 
from the prior request. 
In its memorandum order awarding attorney fees, the court noted that "[i]n the 
Court's opinion Plaintiffs attorney made no real effort to comply with the Court's 
directive to submit a claim for attorney's fees and costs associated with the successful 
breach of contract claim." [See Plaintiffs Brief, Addendum No. "10," pp. 2-3]. The 
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court therefore determined that "[s]ince the Plaintiff has failed to provide any factual 
basis upon which the Court can determine the reasonableness of the Plaintiffs claim for 
attorney's fees and costs, the Court will have to make its own evaluation of the request 
based upon its knowledge of the case and evaluation of the claimed fees and costs and the 
Court's experience and knowledge of attorney's fees in similar cases." 
On appeal, in defense of her failure to designate fees, Plaintiff argues that even if 
she was required to designate her fees, she met this requirement because it was 
impossible to separate the time spent on the Breach of Contract claim compared to the 
other causes of action. [See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 50]. Likewise, Plaintiff argues that her 
recovery of attorney fees should not be limited to those fees arising from the Breach of 
Contract claim because her causes of action "were so closely related and intertwined as to 
be indistinguishable." [Id.]. Plaintiff argues that because her causes of action are so 
closely related, she is entitled to recover the fees expended in pursuit of all the claims 
because "[w]here the proof of a compensable claim and otherwise non-compensable 
claim are closely related and require proof of the same facts, a successful party is entitled 
to recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related facts." [Id. (citing Kurth v. 
Wiarda, 991 P.2d 113,116 (Utah App. 1999)).] 
In Winters v. Schulrnan, this court affirmed that when there are multiple claims and 
the party prevails on only a portion of them, if the claims all involve a common core of 
facts and legal theories, the party may recover all attorney fees reasonably incurred. 
Winters v. Schulrnan, 2001 WL 357124 (Utah App. 2001). However, the court also noted 
that it was not an abuse of discretion when a trial court reduced the fee requested based 
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on the trial court's specific finding that although the facts and legal theories involved in 
the claims originally overlapped, they were "not so intertwined that they could not be 
categorized according to the theory at issue." Id. 
Like the court in Winters v. Schulman, the trial court in the case at hand did not 
commit an abuse of discretion when it reduced the fees Plaintiff requested. In its 
Findings of Facts on the issue of attorney fees, the trial court specifically noted: 
The Court realizes that it is difficult to differentiate between what legal 
services were necessary for the prosecution of the subject breach of contract 
claim and the Plaintiffs other causes of action. The Court does know from his 
involvement with the case that a substantial portion of the motions in the case, 
especially the various motions for summary judgment involved causes of 
action other than the breach of contract cause of action. It is the Court's 
perception also that a substantial portion of the discovery in the case involves 
defects other than the improper grading and involved information dealing with 
the other causes of action. 
Based on these findings, Plaintiff should have been able to designate her fees as 
requested, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to award her the 
entire amount of herrequest. 
The court also based its reduction of the requested amount of attorney fees on its 
evaluation of the factors set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Dixie State 
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) that trial courts should consider in 
determining a reasonable attorneys fee. In regards to the issue of whether the work 
performed was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, the Court 
observed that both sides generated attorney fees that were not reasonable or necessary. 
Specifically, the court found that "[tjhere were substantial unnecessary attorney's fees 
generated in Motions to Reconsider and in disputes over the language in proposed orders 
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and unnecessary discovery disputes." [See Plaintiffs Brief, Addendum No. "10," p. 4]. 
The trial court went on to identify two other factors that while not determinative of the 
reasonableness of the subject fee, were factors the court believed relevant in making an 
overall determination of reasonableness. First, the fact that the requested fee of $120,000 
was more then four times the monetary award granted to the Plaintiff by the jury, and 
second, that the requested fee was substantially more than the entire purchase price of the 
house at issue. Id. Ultimately, the court noted that "[gjiven the fact the Plaintiff failed to 
respond to the Court directive to recalculate her attorney's fees and costs to those 
associated with the breach of contract claim only and for the reasons stated above, the 
Court finds that it is reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded an attorney's fee in the 
amount of $40,000." Id. 
D. The trial court did not apply Rule 54(d) standards to his determination 
of reasonable costs. 
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in applying Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(d) standards to the meaning of costs. In reviewing Plaintiffs itemized claims for costs 
the trial court noted that many of the items listed were not the type of costs usually 
recoverable under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [See Plaintiffs Brief, 
Addendum No. "10," p. 4]. The Court then went on to list the other, nontraditional costs 
that Plaintiff claimed she had a right to recover under paragraph "N" of the EMS A. The 
court ultimately found that as the prevailing party, Plaintiff was "entitled to recover those 
normal costs awarded to a prevailing party pursuant to Rule 54 and any other costs or 
expenses associated with the breach of contract claim. As can be seen by this language, 
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the court was not "limiting the meaning of costs to fit within the confines of Rule 54" as 
Plaintiff claims. Instead, plaintiffs limitation on the recovery of costs occurred for the 
same reason as its limitation on the recovery of attorney fees, because "[t]here was no 
attempt by Plaintiff to allocate which costs.. .should be attributed to the breach of contract 
claims for which recovery was awarded by the jury." Likewise, because the Plaintiff 
"failed to respond to the Court directive to recalculate her.. .costs to those associated with 
the breach of contract claim only and for the reasons stated above, the Court [found] that 
it was reasonable to award costs in the amount of $10,000." Id. 
Plaintiffs final attorney fee and costs request in the amount of $158,927.72 is 
shocking given the fact that the cost of the home itself was only $83,000.00. Plaintiffs 
request does not even take into account the award of damages in the amount of 
$30,680.00. The trial court simply did not abuse its discretion in limiting the recovery by 
Plaintiff of her fees and costs. 
Finally, Plaintiff would not be entitled to recover any fees or costs should this 
Court find that Plaintiffs Breach of Contract claims are barred by the relevant statue of 
limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by failing to determine and require the jury to determine when 
Plaintiffs causes of action could have been reasonably discovered. This failure of the 
trial court and jury to situate this fact throughout the course of litigation led to numerous 
mistakes in sundry rulings by the trial court and ultimately in the verdict rendered by the 
jury. Instead, the jury was improperly asked to determine a question of law (whether the 
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statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs claims) without first determining when the 
Plaintiffs causes of action accrued. These failures resulted in a misapplication of the 
incorrect statute of limitations, and a misinterpretation of that statute. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs claims should have been barred by the doctrine of caveat 
emptor because Plaintiff could have discovered any patent or latent defects through a 
simple inspection. The EMS A indicated that the Plaintiff and her husband were 
purchasing the home "as is" and even granted Plaintiff an opportunity to have the home 
inspected. Plaintiff failed to do so. 
The trial court correctly granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants 
on both Plaintiffs Fraudulent Nondisclosure claim and the Breach of Contract claim. In 
any case, both claims should have been barred by the statute of limitations and/or the 
doctrine of caveat emptor. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs because her breach of contract 
claim is barred by the statute of limitations and/or caveat emptor. Defendants, however, 
should be entitled to recoup all of their reasonable attorney's fees and costs as set forth in 
the EMS A for prevailing in their defense under the contract. 
Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request that this Court: 
1. partially reverse the following Orders insofar as those Orders failed to 
properly apply and interpret the correct statute of limitations : (a) 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment entered on August 16, 2001, 
(b) Order partially denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
entered on August 29, 200 
2. remand for new trial, if necessary on any of Plaintiff s claims that survive 
summary judgment 
3. reverse the Special Verdict and Judgment entered on March 10, 2005 for 
the amount of $30,680.00 against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiffs; 
4. reverse the Order denying Defendants' Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment 
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Notwithstanding the Verdict entered on July 6, 2005 
5. reverse the Order denying Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment entered on July 19, 2005; 
6. reverse the Order entered on August 25, 2005 awarding attorneys' fees to Plaintiff 
inasmuch as Plaintiffs failed on her breach of contract claim; 
7. instruct the trial court to award Defendants their reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in defending this lawsuit and pursuant to the EMSA. 
•*ST Respectfully submitted this 18 day of September, 2006 
/ ASCIONE; HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C., 
( Attorneys for Defendants Dan Smith and Carol Smith 
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ADDENDA 
1. August 21, 2003 Memorandum Decision 
2. Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
3. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Breach of Contract Claims 
4. Response to Court's Directive Regarding Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses. 
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Plaintiffs, 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee 
of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
and CAROL SMITH, individually and as 




Case No. 000700142 MI 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court has reviewed the file, considered the pleadings filed by the parties, heard the argument of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, issues this ruling: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, recission, fraudulent nondisclosure, 
misrepresentation, violation of the Consumer Sales Practice Act, and punitive damages causes of 
action. Defendants raised the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations among others. 
Defendants filed a previous Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court granted the Motion as to 
the claim for negligent misrepresentation and dismissed the claim. The Court denied the Motion 
as to Plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. The Court also 
ruled that the discovery rule applies in this case and tolled the statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs 
were also required to elect a remedy, and the Plaintiffs elected to pursue the remedy of recession. 
Defendants filed this second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
inVPISPUTED FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs' home, the subject matter of this litigation, is located at 155 West 300 
South, Fillmore City, Millard County, State of Utah (hereinafter the "Home"). 
2. Defendant Dan Smith is an experienced licensed builder, who obtained the proper 
building permit and constructed the Home with the intent that it be Defendants1 residence. 
3. Neither of the Plaintiffs have ever been a contractor or an engineer, nor do 
Plaintiffs have any special knowledge concerning building codes, home construction, safety 
inspections, etc. 
4. The Home's construction was inspected and approved by the Fillmore City 
Building Inspector throughout its construction 
5. At the time of the final inspection, the ground around the house was so muddy that 
the finish grading was impossible. Jack Peterson, Fillmore City's Building Inspector, gave the 
Smiths permission to finish grading in the spring when the weather cleared Based upon the 
Smiths' promise to complete the grading, Jack Peterson approved the final Home inspection As 
uncorrected this is a violation of the Uniform Building Code. 
6. Defendants moved in to the Home in November of 1993, Defendants received a 
Certificate of Ocbupancy from Fillmore City Building Inspector on or about January 28, 1994. 
On February 11, 1994 the Plaintiffs and Defendants met to discuss the sale of the Home, and an 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered between the parties on or about February 15, 1994 
7. The Agreement stated in pertinent part that; 
Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1(c) 
above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical condition, except: 
(blank) 
8. The relevant general provisions state: 
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B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is 
purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by 
reason of any representation made by to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling 
Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income 
here from or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition 
subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6, In the event that Buyer 
desires an additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but 
arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller wairants that: (a) Seller has received no 
claim or notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which 
has not or which will not be remedied prior to closing. 
9. Plaintiffs walked through the Home before entering into the Agreement. 
Defendants did not disclose any alleged code violations or defects to the Plaintiffs prior to the sell. 
10. Plaintiffs did not condition the purchase of the property on the outcome of a home 
inspection, and Plaintiffs did not have an independent home inspection performed prior to 
purchasing the Home. 
11. In the year 2000, Jason Bullock walked through the house as though he were 
performing a final inspection and discovered the thirty (30) alleged code violations identified by 
the Plaintiffs. An addition twelve (12) alleged code violations identified by the Plaintiffs were 
added by Lloyd Steenblik's inspection. 
13. Plaintiffs admitted that all of the (forty two) 42 alleged defects could have been 
discovered by a home inspection before they bought the house, and Plaintiffs admitted that the 
only latent defects as defined by the court are alleged defect items 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, 39, 
DISPUTED FACTS 
1. The home contained Uniform Building Code (UBC) violations during the 
inspection period and the home was approved despite those alleged violations. The Smiths were 
aware of the alleged UBC violations. 
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2. Felt paper was properly installed and served as flashing for the windows, 
3. Some floor joists are overspanned, 
4. Plaintiffs discovered or were placed on notice of many of the alleged defects long 
before the home inspection in 2000. 
5. Alleged defect items 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, 39 are latent defects. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. When applying this rule, the Utah Supreme 
Court has indicated that, when considering a motion for summary judgment, all facts and 
inferences arising therefrom must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
Winegar v. Froer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, the Court hereby grants 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in part and denies in part. 
Fraudulent Nondiclosure 
To support a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure a plaintiff must show (1) the nondisclosed 
information is material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, 
and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate. Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 576 (Utah 
2001). 
In the sale of new homes, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine of caveat 
emptor has eroded, but in the area of used residences it is "reasonable to hold the purchaser to the 
caveat emptor doctrine." See, Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P,2d 1384, 1389 (Utah App. 
1994)(quoting, Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 
645 (Utah 1982). A home inspection is not required when purchasing a new home because the 
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doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply. In this case, Plaintiffs did not dispute that the Smiths 
lived in the Home or that the Smiths intended it to be their home in their response to Defendants' 
first Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, it is an admission. The Court finds that the Home 
is a used home because the Smiths intended it to be their home, they lived in the Home for a short 
period of time, and Plaintiffs have admitted these facts. 
A duty to disclose in a vendor-vendee transaction of a used home exists only where a 
defect is "not discoverable by reasonable care," and if the defect could be discovered by 
reasonable care, the doctrine of caveat emptor prevails and precludes recovery by the vendee. 
Mitchell 31 P.3d at S15\Maackv. Resource Design & Const, Inc., 875 P.2d 570, 579 (Utah 
App. 1994), The standard of reasonable care is whether the defect would be apparent to ordinary 
prudent persons with like experience, not to persons with specialized knowledge in the field of 
construction or real estate. Mitchell, 31 P.3d at 575, The ordinary prudent person standard does 
not mean that inspection by an expert will never be required. There are circumstances where 
"reasonably prudent buyer should be put on notice that a possible defect exists, necessitating 
either further inquiry of the owner of the home, who is under a duty not to engage in fraud, 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980), or inspection by someone with sufficient 
expertise to appraise the defect." Mitchell, 31 P.3d at 575, 
Citing facts most favorable to Plaintiffs, the nonmoving party, the alleged nondisclosed 
building code defects are material, and Defendant Smiths knew of the alleged building code 
violations. Therefore, the Smiths were only legally obligated to disclose defects that were not 
discoverable by reasonable care. 
Plaintiffs admitted that all of the defects items except items number 9, 11, 12, 26, 27, 38, 
39 were patent and that they could have been discovered by a home inspection. Therefore, the 
doctrine of caveat emptor applies, and the Court grants the Defendants Motion for Summary 
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Judgment regarding the admitted patent items because they could have reasonably been 
discovered by the Plaintiffs. 
Additionally, the Court finds that alleged defect item number 12, "no smoke detectors in 
bedrooms and the only smoke detector in the house is a battery detector" to be an item that could 
have reasonably been discovered by the Plaintiffs. Likewise, alleged defect Item number 38 
"insulation baffles to allow ventilation at exterior walls" is an item that could have reasonably 
been discovered by the Plaintiffs by observing there were not vents on the House in the roof area 
Therefore, the Court grants the Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to these alleged 
defects and denies the Motion as to the remaining alleged defects. 
Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
The elements of an action based on fraudulent misrepresentation are- (1) a representation, 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact, (3) which was false, (4) which the representor 
either, (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge up 
which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon 
it, and (8) was thereby induced to act to his injury and damage. Maack, 875 p,2d at 584. 
In Maack, caveat emptor was not dispositive of this issue. The Court relied on whether 
the misrepresentation was concerning a presently existing material fact. Id, at 584. The Court 
finds that there are disputed material facts regarding this claim and denies Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to this claim. 
Statute of Limitations 
Construction defect cases are governed by Utah Code Section 78-12-21,5, which states 
that an action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within 
six years of the date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction All other 
Ruling Page 6 
R P P P I V P H T i mp Nov I f ) I I ^1AM 
actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the earlier of the date 
of discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been 
discovered through reasonable diligence. Also, this Court ruled in the first Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the discovery doctrine applies in this case The discovery doctrine tolls a cause of 
action until the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts giving rise to the cause of action 
BYUv. Paulsen, 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1987) Plaintiffs assert that they were first aware of 
the defects in the year 2000. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs were aware of some of the defects 
shortly after moving into the home, The Court finds that there are disputed material facts as to 
this defense and deny Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby grants Defendants' Motion for Summary 
regarding the Plaintiffs' Fraudulent Nondisclosure claim as to defect items 1-8, 10, 12 -257 28-38, 
and 40. The Court denies the Defendants' Motion as to all remaining issues The Court directs 
counsel for the defendant to prepare an order consistent with the decision, submit it to opposing 
counsel for review, and then to the Court for execution. 
DATED this y of August, 200 
^ ^ r i * A M " , • > « * * . y 
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L DISCUSSION OF UNDISPUTED FACTS-REBUTTAL TO PLAINTIFFS FALSE 
STATEMENTS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE ISSUES OF FACT. 
Nearly every fact that Plaintiffs tried to dispute remains undisputed. The tactic Plaintiffs' 
counsel employs to dispute facts suggests his modus operandi: he misstates or mis-characterizes the 
fact in order to have grounds to dispute it. This is apparent with every alleged disputed material fact. 
Fact Number 2: 'The Smiths built the Home for their own residence. Deposition of 
Dan Smith, p. 71, the pertinent pages of which are annexed hereto as Exhibit 4." 
The Smiths supported this statement with deposition testimony of Dan Smith. The Plaintiffs 
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dispute this fact by a reference to the deposition of Mary Moore that says nothing of Dan Smiths' 
intentions. Plaintiffs also cite to the deposition of Jack Peterson where on several pages he states 
his understanding that the Smiths intended to live in the home he was inspecting. Page 63 of his 
deposition cited by Plaintiffs shows a good example: "well, I think ought to be clear is at that time 
this home was, as far as I knew, not for sale. I thought Dan and his wife were going to be in there 
permanently." Therefore, Jack Peterson's deposition supports the Smiths' assertion of fact. 
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the Smiths built the home for the purpose of 
resale. There is only Plaintiffs' disbelief of the testimony of Dan Smith and Jack Peterson. The 
Plaintiffs can choose to disbelieve the Smiths' intentions and Dan Smiths' and Jack Peterson's 
testimony, but if they are to raise a genuine issue they must do so with facts. The only facts alleged 
by Plaintiffs are misleading. While it is true that the Certificate of Occupancy was issued in January 
of 1994, the final inspection happened on November 8, 1993. See exhibit 8 to the moving 
memorandum. The Smiths moved in shortly thereafter, one week before Thanksgiving. Dan Smith 
deposition, p. 61, lines 14-15 annexed hereto as exhibit 15. Plaintiffs also fail to acknowledge that 
the house was not listed for sale when they approached the Smiths about buying it. Dan Smith 
deposition, pp. 67-68. Moore deposition, p. 9,11. 12-13. The Plaintiffs also fail to acknowledge that 
the sale of the house did not close until May 2, 1994. Affidavit of Mary Moore, p. 61, line 4, 
annexed hereto as exhibit 16. See also Settlement Statement annexed hereto as exhibit 17. Nor do 
they acknowledge that Smith testified that they moved because the Smith's son moved to Cedar City 
and asked his father to build him a new home in Cedar City. Dan Smith deposition. P. 61. 
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Fact Number 4: "The Home's construction was inspected and approved by the 
appropriate agencies throughout its construction. See May 4, 2001, letter from Fillmore City 
annexed hereto as Exhibit 6. Also see p. 89 of Peterson deposition annexed hereto as Exhibit 7." 
These facts are not in dispute. There is no dispute that Jack Peterson actually approved the 
final inspection and issued a Certificate of Occupancy. Plaintiffs' counsel goes off on a tangent 
about whether a building inspector has the right to approve code violations. Thus, he engages in this 
self-contradiction at page 2 of his brief: "Approval of a violation of the UBC shall not be construed 
to be "approval." This argument assumes facts that don't exist in this case except in a couple of 
instances, one involving the stairs where Jack Peterson observed the stairs were not compliant and 
specifically approved them as a variance. Whether Jack Peterson had the right to approve a 
variance1 is beside the point. He did approve the stairs. There is no factual citation to the contrary. 
This is simply another illustration of Plaintiffs' counsel's willingness to torture key definitions in 
the most brazen and audacious ways. 
The relevance of the city building inspector's approval is very important. It addresses 
whether Dan Smith was aware of latent defects. If he received approval of the building inspector 
on the very points where he has been accused of code violations he has no reason to believe that 
there are latent defects he must disclose to any purchasers. 
Fact Number 5: "The Fillmore City Building Inspector, Jack Peterson, discussed the amount 
1
 The Smiths' expert has said that the code does give the inspector this right. But that is 
an issue that need not be discussed because it is not relevant to this motion. 
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of roof ventilation with Mr. Smith and approved the as-built ventilation. See Deposition of Jack 
Peterson at p. I l l , Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 5 to his deposition, annexed as Exhibit 7a." 
Fact Number 6: "The City Building Inspector expressly approved the height of the stairs 
even though they were not in technical compliance with the code. See Exhibit 7, Peterson 
deposition at pp. 65, 66." 
Plaintiffs' counsel simply asserts that "approval" was not granted based on his argument that 
Peterson's approval was not "approval." The purpose of a statement of facts is to show the court 
where there are genuine issues of fact. This quibbling over definitions frustrates this purpose. There 
can be no communication here because words don't mean to Plaintiffs counsel what they mean 
ordinarily. The Smiths' factual assertions in five and six are that the inspector approved the attic 
ventilation and the stairs. There is no rational or genuine dispute about these facts. The legal effect 
of this fact might be disputed but Plaintiffs cannot honestly deny the fact exists simply because they 
dispute its relevance. 
Fact Number 7: "During one of the construction inspections, the City Building Inspector 
observed the felt paper that served as flashing for the windows. See Peterson deposition at p. 54, 
Exhibit 7." 
Here again Plaintiff cannot honestly dispute this fact. Whether Plaintiffs' experts who never 
did destructive testing disagree is irrelevant. The fact that Jack Peterson observed it is undisputed. 
Fact Number 8: "The Smiths obtained a Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance 
on or about January 28, 1994. See Certificate of Occupancy and Zoning Compliance annexed to 
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Peterson deposition as Exhibit 7, found here as Exhibit 8." 
Fact Number 9: "The City Building Inspector signed off on the certificate of occupancy and 
the final inspection. See Peterson deposition, at p. 88, Exhibit 7." 
Here again, Plaintiffs' grounds for dispute are dishonest. They do not really dispute the 
facts. They cannot. They only allege that the certificate is meaningless because it was fraudulently 
obtained. They of course have no facts to support this outrageous allegation. Where do they even 
insinuate that Jack Peterson was deceived? He saw everything and approved it. This deserves Rule 
11 Sanctions. 
Facts Numbered 23-23g: "Plaintiffs discovered, or, were placed on notice of, many of the 
alleged defects long before the home inspection in 2000: 
A. Mary Moore knew of the alleged window defects almost immediately upon 
moving into the house when she saw flaking of paint caused by water at the end of the first winter. 
See Moore deposition, Vol I, pp. 41-42. Exhibit 11. 
B. Mary Moore also saw exposed footings the first spring when she moved into 
the house while doing landscaping. See Moore deposition, Vol I, pp. 46,47. Exhibit 11. 
C. Defect Number 4 on Steenblik's list, alleging water damage and cracking to 
the southeast corner of the foundation, was known to Mary Moore the first spring after she moved 
into the house. See Moore deposition, Vol. I, pp. 107-108. Exhibit 11. 
D. Some allegedly bad shingles on the garage roof were called to Mary Moore's 
attention on November 7, 1997, when she had the shingles inspected by the shingle manufacturer 
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and was told that they were damaged by inadequate ventilation. See Moore deposition, Vol. II, p. 
167 (Exhibit 11), and Exhibit 6 to her deposition. (Annexed here as 11A). 
E. Defect Number 41 in Steenblik' s list, alleging plumbing defects, were known 
to Mary Moore six months after she moved into the Home. See Moore deposition, Vol. I, p. 27. 
Exhibit 11. 
R Defect Number 12, alleging that the smoke detectors were omitted from the 
bedrooms, was known to Mary Moore approximately one year after moving into the Home. See 
Moore deposition, Vol. I, pp. 94,95. Exhibit 11. 
G. The various minor electrical problems alleged by Plaintiffs were known to 
Mary Moore in December, 1997, when she was given notice of the need to check the circuit breaker 
after the furnace stopped working. See Moore deposition, Vol. I, p. 104. Exhibit 11. See also 
Exhibit 11 A." 
Plaintiffs' disputations of these facts are again inappropriate. Mary Moore saw these 
conditions as she testified in her deposition. She was asked to testify to the damage she had seen 
caused by the defects alleged. She responded to those questions in the pages cited above. Plaintiffs 
have not shown that these deposition citations are wrong. Plaintiffs simply argue that knowledge 
of the condition is not knowledge of a defect. They argue that Mary Moore needed an expert 
opinion before she knew there were defects. The Smiths disagree, asserting confidently that when 
Mary learned of the condition the statute of limitations began to run, not when she was given an 
expert's report. That is a legitimate issue of law which is discussed below. However, it is not an 
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issue of fact. For plaintiffs' counsel to pretend that Mary Moore did not see the flaking of paint at 
window sills which she herself attributed to defective windows is sanctionable. 
Fact Number 25: "Plaintiffs have admitted that all of the alleged defects are patent except 
items 9, 12, 26, 27, 38 and 39.2 See Plaintiffs' Answers to Second Set of Admission, Response 
Number 9, and the Second Set of Requests for Admission, Request Number 9. Exhibit 10." 
The cited responses to requests for admissions clearly show that Plaintiffs did make the 
admissions stated. Plaintiffs have disputed this only on the grounds that the definition of "latent 
defects" that they were using when they answered the requests was a different definition than what 
they are using to dispute Fact Number 25. That sophistry is nothing less than sanctionable. It 
should be given no credence by this court. As shown in the moving brief, the requests themselves 
refer the plaintiffs to the use of the phrase "latent defect" by the court in its previous order on the 
Smiths' motion for summary judgment. Anticipating the Plaintiffs' counsel's slipperiness, the 
Smiths defined the phrase for him in the requests to admit and yet he still has the audacity to use 
double definitions. 
2
 The Smiths propounded to the Plaintiffs a request for admission intended to establish 
which defects were admittedly patent and which were considered by the Plaintiffs to be "latent," 
as the latter term is used in the Court's August 16, 2001, Order. Request Number 9 stated: 
Admit that the alleged construction defects described in items 1 thru 42 in your 
expert witness report at the time of the sale of the house were not a latent defects 
as the phrase "latent defecf'is used in the court's order regarding the Smiths' 
motion for summary judgment." 
In response, Plaintiffs admitted that all of the defects were not latent except items 9, 12, 26, 27, 
38 and 39. 
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Fact Number 26: 'There is no evidence of serious damage to the integrity of the house. 
There is no allegation that the roof leaks. See Mary Moore deposition, p. 20. Exhibit 11. There is 
no known damage to footings or foundation. See Mary Moore deposition p. 45. Exhibit 11." 
Plaintiffs' counsel misleads in this attempted to dispute of facts. Again, the factual matter 
is not disputed. Mary Moore admitted there were no roof leaks, and that she knew of no damage to 
the footings or foundation. Neither do her experts. Counsel simply changes the definition of 
"damage to the integrity of the house" to mean that technical code violations constitute physical 
damage. It is close to intentional falsehood. It is certainly sanctionable. 
Fact Number 29: "Allegation of Overspanning of Floor Joists. Peterson testified that the 
code allows for a 13 foot one inch span. Peterson measured the span and found in his report , 
Exhibit 4 to his deposition, annexed hereto as Exhibit 7B, that no joists exceeded that span. P. 75." 
Again, these facts are undisputed. Plaintiffs do not cite facts to the contrary. That they have 
an expert who at one time had a different opinion does not change the fact that the building inspector 
found the floor joists to be code compliant. The relevance of this fact is not whether the code allows 
that length of floor joist. The relevant fact is Smith's knowledge of any potential defect. Dan Smith 
had no reason to believe that he should disclose anything about floor joists to the plaintiffs. The 
conclusion about Smith's knowledge might even be in dispute but the fact that Peterson found the 
floor joists to be code compliant is not disputed. 
Fact Numbers 30 and 31: "Alleged lack of dirt covering the footings. At the time of the 
final inspection the ground around the house was so "muddy" that the finish "grading was 
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the home in question, may have had a legal duty to disclose to Plaintiffs any latent and material 
defects in the home" of which the Smiths were aware. Plaintiffs quote in their brief this pertinent 
language from Maack: if there are any '"material defects of which the seller was aware, the buyer 
may have a cause of action for fraud.' P. 582." See page 12 of the opposition brief. The plaintiffs 
argue that a house the Smiths moved into in November of 1993 and that the Moores moved into in 
May of 1994 was new when they moved in. But even if that preposterous position were true, what 
difference would it make to their proof? They believe that it would eliminate the requirement that 
they must have a home inspection in order to avoid caveat emptor. As shown below, that argument 
fails. But at least the parties agree on this much, Plaintiffs must prove that the Smiths knew of 
material, latent construction defects at that time they sold the house to the Plaintiffs. 
The Smiths in section "C" of their moving brief at pages 23-26 alleged that the Plaintiffs had 
not complied with the elements of their case in chief as mentioned above, that is, proof of latent 
defects of which the Smiths were aware. The plaintiffs only opposed this argument by claiming 
without support that "virtually" and "almost all of the 42 violations would not be apparent to the 
ordinary buyer without specialized knowledge in construction. . . ." This argument ignores the 
undisputed facts. First, Plaintiffs have by response to requests for admissions admitted that of the 
42 alleged defects all but items 9, 26, 27, 38, 39 and 12 are not latent defects. Thus, only six 
defects survive this first threshold of summary judgment. All the rest, not qualifying as latent 
defects, must be dismissed. Plaintiffs try to give some unintelligible explanation for why they 
admitted that 36 defects were not latent. However, the request for admission is plain. It referred 
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to the definition of the phrase "latent defect" as used "in the court's order regarding the Smiths' 
motion for summary judgment." Therefore, 36 of the 42 alleged defects are not of the type of defect 
that could survive summary judgment according to the court's previous order. 
Of the six items remaining only items 9,26 and 27 are material. The other three are so minor 
that if they survive summary judgment they will not justify a rescission. Therefore, only 9, 26 and 
27 will be discussed. Item 9 concerns whether there was a defect in the flashing. It is undisputed 
that Dan Smith believes there is no defect and that he has no knowledge of a defect in the flashing. 
It is undisputed that the inspector has concluded there is no defect in the flashing and that the small 
amount of water comes from condensation on the windows. It is undisputed that the building 
inspector saw the flashing or felt paper when he performed his inspection. It is also undisputed that 
the Plaintiffs' experts have performed no destructive testing of the windows to determine the nature 
of any flashing defect. The only disputed fact is this. It is Plaintiffs experts' opinion simply that 
since there is some small evidence of water there must be a defect in the flashing. That falls far 
short of evidence that Dan Smith knew of a defect in flashing when he built the house. That issue 
cannot go to trial. 
Item 26 concerns the span lengths of the floor joists. Jack Peterson testified to the allowable 
span of a joist as 13 feet one inch. He also testified that he provided home builders with a sheet of 
paper that showed among other things the maximum length of floor joists. This was exhibit 3 to his 
deposition and is annexed hereto as exhibit 18. It is undisputed that Jack Peterson measured the 
spans and found them to be code compliant. It is undisputed that Peterson passed that item off on 
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his inspection. How then could Dan Smith have known of a defect when the building inspector says 
there was no defect? 
Item 27, as shown before, was also a matter known by Jack Peterson who allowed a 
Certificate of Occupancy without technical compliance. 
III. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT REBUTTED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
DEFENSE. 
Plaintiffs do not respond to the substance of the Smiths' arguments on the statute of 
limitations. They make two points only, both of which are glaringly erroneous. First, they argue 
that this defense had been defeated in a previous motion for summary judgment. Exhibit 3 to the 
memo in support of summary judgment is the order granting in part and denying part the Smiths' 
previous motion for summary judgment. The court at page 3 of the order specifically stated: "The 
Court will consider, at the close of all discovery, a motion for summary judgment by Defendants, 
based on their limitations defense." 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the discovery rule applies to the statute of limitations. That is 
true under certain circumstances that may not exist in this case (See the BYU case discussed below) 
but Plaintiffs erroneously argue that they, as a matter of law, discovered the defects only upon 
receiving their expert's report of alleged code violations. It is not when the expert gives the opinion 
that governs the start of the limitations period. It is when the plaintiff learns of a condition that may 
or may not be caused by a construction defect. The plaintiff is then placed on inquiry notice to find 
out what caused the damage. Otherwise, a Plaintiff could delay the running of the limitations period 
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indefinitely until he or she got around to getting an expert report. 
Apparently in the one case presented to the Utah appellate courts asking for the application 
of the discovery rule to a construction defect, the court decided that the discovery rule was not 
applicable. See BYU v. Paulsen Construction Co, 744 P. 2d 1370 (Utah 1987) discussed below. 
But in a case alleging that the government destroyed mining rights and did damage to real property, 
Dahl v. US, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (CD. Utah 2001), the court succinctly explained the discovery 
rule in Utah: 
Under the discovery accrual rule, if an injury is such that it should 
reasonably be discovered at the time it occurs, then a plaintiff should 
be charged with the discovery of the injury, and the limitations period 
should commence, at that time. But if, on the other hand, the injury 
is not of the sort that can readily be discovered when it occurs, then 
the action will accrue, and the limitations period commence, only 
when the plaintiff has discovered, or with due diligence should have 
discovered, the injury. Accrual is the date on which the statute of 
limitations begins to run. It is not the date on which the wrong that 
injures the plaintiff occurs, but the date, often the same but 
sometimes later, on which the plaintiff discovers that he has been 
injured. 
Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc., 749 A. 2d 796 (MD App. 2000) is a recent case 
applying the discovery rule to a construction defect case. In Lumsden a homeowner saw his 
driveway crack in October after an ice clearing company salted it down. The following August he 
discovered that the cracks were not the ice clearing company's fault, but instead the driveway had 
been installed with poor concrete. The two-year Maryland statute of limitation against the builder 
of the driveway for breach of warranty began to run when the homeowner first discovered the 
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cracks. The court described the law regarding inquiry notice and the discovery rule: 
Under the discovery rule for a statute of limitation, a claimant reasonably 
should know of a wrong if the claimant has knowledge of circumstances 
which ought to have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry, which 
would charge the claimant with notice of all facts which such an 
investigation would in all probability have disclosed. 
In other words, under the discovery rule, a statute of limitations begins to run when a claimant gains 
knowledge sufficient to put him on inquiry notice; from that date forward he will be charged with 
knowledge of facts that would have been disclosed by a reasonable investigation. Thus the 
homeowner was charged with inquiry notice when he saw the cracks, and the statute of limitations 
began to run at the same time. Thus, in this case when the Moores first saw water damage and 
cracking in the foundation and curling roof tiles they were then charged with the knowledge they 
later gained upon learning of the expert's reports. 
In BYU v. Paulsen Construction Co, 744 P. 2d 1370 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the discovery rule: 
The general rule in Utah is that "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause 
of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations.1' Becton 
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983); Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). ' 
. . . .We find nothing in the present case that warrants use of the discovery 
rule. The six-year period of limitation expired on BYU's cause of action 
against Paulsen on November 1, 1982. It is undisputed that BYU discovered 
the leakage and improper pipe insulation no later than May of 1979. Unlike 
the plaintiffs mMyers, BYU knew of its cause of action against Paulsen three 
and a half years before the limitation period expired. The discovery rule has 
no application when an action easily could have been filed between the date 
of discovery and the end of the limitation period. 
The court implied that the discovery rule could be applied where equitable circumstances demanded 
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it but found none in that case. Thus, all damage that Mary Moore discovered in the few years after 
her purchase of the house started the statute of limitations running. There was thus no need for the 
application of the discovery rule. Mere ignorance, whether intentional or not, does not suspend the 
running of the statute. 
In Buck v. Miles, 971 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1999), the Hawai'i Supreme Court rejected (in the 
context of a medical malpractice action) the exact argument being made by the Plaintiffs here. In 
Buck, the plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
- the motion was granted, in part, on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to file her complaint 
within the two year statute of limitations. Plaintiff based her appeal on the argument that the statute 
of limitations was tolled until she was able to secure a favorable expert opinion supporting her 
claims. Buckat718-719. Indeed, she argued that her'"subjective, unsubstantiated belief that she 
had a cause of action . . . [was] insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations." Buck at 722. The 
Hawai'i Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the plaintiffs arguments, stating: 
[I]t is clear from the language of the statute and from the Hawai'i Supreme Court's 
language in Yamaguchi that the statute of limitations is triggered by the plaintiffs 
knowledge, not by [her] counsel's investigation. 
Buck at 720. Moreover, the Buck court concluded by holding that: 
None of our cases support [plaintiffs] contention. For a cause of action to accrue, 
and thus the statute of limitations to commence . . ., legal knowledge of the 
defendant's negligence is not required. Under the discovery rule, a plaintiff need 
only have factual knowledge of the elements necessary for an actionable claim. 
Thus, contrary to [plaintiffs] contention, an expert opinion validating the legal basis 
for a claim is not required in order to trigger the running of the statute of limitations 
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Buck at 722 - 723 (citations omitted). 
If the discovery rule applies, the limitations period began to run when Mary Moore and her 
late husband found out about the damage they are alleging in this case. As shown in the opening 
brief there is no substantial damage to this house. In best case scenario for Plaintiffs there are a few 
technical code violations, but they do not arise to the level of a construction defect. Still, although 
the damage is slight it is this slight damage that has given birth to this huge lawsuit. Therefore, 
notice of slight damage is notice sufficient to start the limitations running. 
Thus, the Plaintiffs have not even attempted to dispute the knowledge of damage that Mary 
Moore admittedly received and when she received it. Their only opposition centers around the 
argument she could not have understood that the damage was caused by a code violation. The 
plaintiffs would have the court ignore the undisputed facts that Mary Moore knew of slight water 
damage at the window sills (there has been no substantial damage caused by water intrusion), knew 
that the concrete footings were exposed (there has been no damage to the footings), knew there was 
a small crack in the foundation (there is again no substantial damage) knew there were some bad 
roof shingles (a part of the roof over the garage was replaced even though there were never any 
leaks), and knew there were insufficient smoke detectors and knew these conditions existed shortly 
after she bought the house. As shown in the moving memorandum, these conditions were known 
to Mary Moore some five years before she found out from her expert report that there may have been 
a code violation involved with this slight damage. As a matter of law, the statute begins to run upon 
inquiry notice to the plaintiff, not upon the report of an expert. 
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IV. PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO OBTAIN A HOME INSPECTION FOR $60 REQUIRES 
DISMISSAL OF THEIR CLAIMS. 
Plaintiffs argue they had no duty to obtain a reasonable home inspection under Maack, supra, 
because they purchased a new home not a used home. It seems that these plaintiffs continually 
assert frivolous legal positions based on strained definitions. They argue that "latent defect" means 
something different when they responded to the Smiths' requests for admission from what it means 
in the Judge's order and in the cases discussing construction defects. This willingness to torture 
definitions is on display again here where they argue that a used house only becomes used if 
someone other than the builder lives in it. Thus, under their definition, if the Smiths had lived in the 
house for six years instead of six months, the house would still be new because no third party had 
lived in the house. 
They argue that a house is not used after it has been lived in for five months. This strain is 
eased by slight of hand. They never mention that the Smiths moved into the home in November and 
that the Moores moved in six months later in May, 1994. They simply talk about the signing of the 
purchase contract in February 14, 1994. Even then they don't mention that the Smiths have lived 
in the house since before Thanksgiving. They act as though the date of the certificate of occupancy 
was the date the Smiths moved in when they know better. The final inspection took place on 
November 8,1993. See exhibit 5 to the Peterson deposition annexed hereto as exhibit 19. See also 
the testimony of Jack Peterson at page 23 of his deposition annexed hereto as exhibit 20. The 
defendants moved in shortly thereafter. 
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Even if this were not a used house, where is the law that says that caveat emptor does not 
apply to this particular sale? There is no citation to authority other than to a quote that there has 
been some erosion of caveat emptor in new housing. The extent of that erosion has not been 
explained by the Plaintiffs by any citation to authority. Is it tract housing that is now exempt from 
caveat emptor? Homes built with a specific buyer in mind? Custom homes? Spec homes? Homes 
over six months old? Who knows? The plaintiffs have never told us. If they had any authority in 
Utah they would have cited it. It appears that the erosion may be a movement in other states but 
Utah still observes caveat emptor. 
The Plaintiffs, impliedly acknowledging the continuing effectiveness of the Maack case, 
argues for its distinction here. They say that in Maack the house had been lived in for more than one 
year by a party other than an owner builder. They don't say where Maack suggests the validity of 
such a distinction. Maack simply says that where caveat emptor applies, as in Utah, it requires the 
purchaser to obtain a reasonable home inspection. As shown in the moving brief, a home inspection 
costing $60 and taking about an hour of time revealed the alleged code violations. That is not a big 
burden to place on a prospective homeowner. If they are going to be picky about ambiguous, hyper-
technical code violations, they should get a home inspector. If they are going to now challenge the 
building inspector's right to issue a certificate of occupancy, then they should have gotten an 
independent inspection. 
V, CONCLUSION 
The material facts are not disputed. Plaintiffs have admitted that 36 of the 42 alleged code 
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violations were not latent. They have not disputed the facts that they knew of the slight damage to 
their home, of which they now complain, within the first year of living there. Therefore, the statute 
of limitations has run. Finally, Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the Maack case but fail to do so. 
Maack clearly holds that where a buyer fails to obtain a reasonable home inspection prior to 
purchase, they are as a matter of law unable to prove that they acted in reasonable reliance on the 
alleged failure to disclose of the homeowner. Under all three of these theories, the Smiths prevail 
as a matter of law. The court should put an end to the financial hemorrhaging caused by this 
frivolous lawsuit. 
DATED this ^ day of O ^ ^ 2 — , 2003. 
DIXON, TRUMAN & FISHER, P.C. 
By: /s^WM*^
 t ? ^ 
£oT A. gRYCE bDCON, ESQ. (#889) 
Attorneys for Defendants 
192 East 200 North, Suite 203 
St. George, UT 84770 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND FACSIMILE 
I do hereby certify that on the 22_ day of Ju f t l / 2003,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing via Federal Express, overnipft delivery, at St. George, Utah, postage repaid 
and addressed as follows, and that I faxed the same, without exhibits, as follows: 
Gregory B. Hadley 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200 
Provo,UT 84604 
(801)377-4411 
An Employee of Dixon, Truman & Fisher, P.C 
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11 Q. Southwest or northwest? 
2 A. West, not southwest or northwest but west. 
31 Q. I believe it is your contention that you have built 
4 Mary Moore's home for the purpose of you and Carol living in 
5 it, is that correct? 
61 A, We built it for our use yes. 
71 Q. What do you mean by "your use"? 
8 A. We intended on staying in Fillmore and that is the 
9 reason we built the home. 
10 Q. So for "your use" means to occupy it? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Was it a retirement home or was that the intention? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. When did you move into the home? 
151 A. A week before Thanksgiving in 1993. 
16 Q. And when did you move out of the home? 
171 A. The end of March of 1994. 
18 Q. What happened to the retirement in this home plan 
19 between Thanksgiving of 1993 and March of 1994? 
20 A. My son who was in medical school just finishing up his 
21 residency asked us if we would go to Cedar City and build him a 
22 new home. 
23 Q. When did he ask you that? 
24 A. Probably in January of 1994. 
25 Q. Where was he living at the time? 
Gregory B. Hadley (3652) 
James K. Haslam (6887) 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200 
Provo Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 377-4403 
Facsimile: (801)377-4411 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM MOORE and MARY MOORE, 
Plaintiffs, j 
Vs. 
DAN SMITH, individually and as Trustee 
of the Dan Irvin Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
and CAROL SMITH, individually and as 
Trustee of the Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos 
Trust, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY MOORE 
Civil No. 000700142 Ml 
Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF MILLARD ) 
Mary Moore, having first been duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one, and I have personal knowledge of the 
matters stated herein except as to any matter stated on information and belief only. 
2. I am a named plaintiff in the above-encaptioned case. 
3. In February of 1994, my husband, William Moore, and I entered into an 
agreement to purchase a home from Dan and Carol Smith. 
4. We closed that transaction on May 2,1994. 
5. The Smiths were paid a total of $83,000.00 for the sale of the home. 
6. The home was intended to be the final home for me and my husband, 
who is retired. 
7. Neither my husband nor I have ever been a contractor or engineer, nor do 
we have any special knowledge concerning building codes, home construction, safety 
inspections, or anything like that. 
8. Despite the fact that Dan Smith had built the home just a few months 
before selling it to us, he did not ever disclose the fact that the home contained certain 
defects, not in compliance with the applicable building code, rendering the home unsafe 
for human occupancy. 
9. In deciding to purchase the relatively new home, my husband and I relied 
upon the certificate of occupancy, which had been issued by the City of Filimore in 
January of 1994, along with Dan Smith's representations that he was selling us 
improved, residential real property, safe for occupancy. 
10. Although my husband and I visually inspected the property, the defects 
and problems that have subsequently been discovered were not of the kind that such 
an inspection would have revealed to us. 
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11. We subsequently took possession of the home, landscaped the yard, and 
have generally maintained the home since that time. 
12. A little more than six years after the purchase, my husband and I had 
retained a company to install a fence on our property. 
13. On May 16, 2000, when the fence workers were digging holes and putting 
in poles for the fence next to the home, the workers called my attention to the fact that 
the home's foundation was not the proper depth into the ground. 
14. That same day, I contacted the City of Fillmore to find out what the 
requirements were for foundation depth and learned that our home's foundation was 
not deep enough into the ground. 
15. I became deeply concerned over this information and retained a 
contractor to determine what would be required to fix the problem. 
16. On August 5, 2000, Ken Zeigler of Ken Zeigler Co. came to our home to 
determine what would need to be done to fix the foundation. 
17. At that time, Mr. Zeigler informed me that he would require that we first 
obtain a safety inspection and recommended that we use Jason Bullock of Sunrise 
Engineering, Inc. for that purpose. 
18. On August 8, 2000, Mr. Bullock came to our home and performed a safety 
inspection. 
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25. I do not believe that we have yet discovered all of the significant defects in 
the construction of our home, and my husband and I are attempting to obtain the funds 
to hire an engineer to conduct a complete inspection and to provide a detailed report. 
26. I do not believe that my husband and 1 could have discovered these 
structural defects prior to August of 2000. 
27. Unless my husband and I can obtain some relief through this court action, 
we will likely not be able to pay to have the defects corrected, or to sell the home for 
anything close to what we paid for the home, and we currently have no other place to 
live. 
DATED this /«? day of March, 2001. 
K<nn*u[ V ? / / v ^ 
Mary Moore 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by Mary Moore, this / a . day of 
March, 2001. 
^ 
Notary Public t ^ 
CONNIE NOYES 
0i&&ffli WTWPUBLIC-STAiEotUttH 
{"JJp~l* '",' 45 SOUTH MAIN 
V S \ ^ / r . . LMORE. UT 84b31 
v
~ ' C0MM EXP 1042003 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed by U.S. mail, first class, postage 
prepaid, the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARY MOORE this / j day of March, 2001, 
to the following: 
A. Bryce Dixon 
Nathan K. Fisher 
Dixon & Truman 
192 East 200 North, Suite 203 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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U S DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 
INHIBIT 
Form Approved OMB No. 2502 0265 
Type of Loan 
D FHA 
D VA 
a FmHA 3 
D Conv Ins. 
D Conv Unlns 6 File Number 
29827-M 
7 Loan Number 8 Mortgage Insurance Case Nun 
Note This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are she 
Hems marked "(poc)" were paid outside the closing, they are shown here (or informaljanaj guxaaseA sxul a/e. oal tod/id/L,. 
the totals. 
Name and Address of Borrower 
liam K. Moore 
y J . Moore 
it Rt- Box 234 
lmore, Ut. 8461] 
E. Name and Address of Seller 
Dan Irvin Smith 
Carol L. Smith 
P.O. 985 
Fillmore, Ut. 84631 
F Name and Address of Lender 
Property Location 
ated in 
lmore, Ut. 84631 
t of Lot 6, Blk. 32, Plat A, Fillmore 
y Survey. 
H Settlement Agent 
{SECURITY TITLF COMPANY OF MILLARD COUNTY 
Place of Settlement 
(P.O. BOX 658 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
I Settlement Date 
5/02/94 
Summary of Borrower's Transaction K Summary of Seller's Transaction 
Gross Amount Due From Borrower 
Contract sales price 
2 Personal property 





Adjustments for items paid by seller In advance 
6 City/town taxes to 
7 County taxes to 





O Qroia Amount Due From Borrower 83,164 B0 
400 Gross Amount Due To Seller 
401 Contract sales price 





Adjustments for Items paid by teller In advance 
408 Crty/town taxes to 
407 County taxes to 





420 Gross Amount Due To Seller 83,000,00 
0 Amounts Paid By Or In Behalf Of Borrower 
1 Deposit or earnest money 
2 Principal amount of new loan(s) 






Adjustments for items unpaid by seller 
0 City/town taxes to 
1 County taxes 1 /m /94o 5/09/94 








O. Total Paid By/For Borrower 
4,000,00 
191.71 
4 , 1 * 3 . 7 1 
500 Reductions In Amount Due To Seller 
501 Excess deposit (see instructions) 
502 Settlement charges to seller (line 1400) 
503 Existing loan(s) taken subject to 
504 Payoff of first mortgage loan 





Adjustment* for items unpaid by setter 
510 City/town taxes to 
511 County taxes 1 / m /q4to S/0? 












Q ^ f l 17 
14,580,88 
10 Cash At Settlement From/To Borrowr 
HJ,lb4.fc0 
BOO Cash At Settlement To/From Seller 
UJ,UOU.OO 1 Gross amount due from borrower (tine 120) 
78 ,9709 
601 Gross amount due to setter (ttne 420) 
602 Less reductions In amt due seller (line 520)| j * 4 ^ ® U ; ^ 8 ) i2 Less amounts paid by/for borrower (line 2201 
13 Cash D From • To Borrower | «\ *E 8,419 12 603 c"ftr» aft w u To j fP From jailer i25 fERS: SELLERS 
//)/??// n /DAM, 
1 (R«y 7/e 
C&it£j J-mld, \)^t(,< 
Settlement Charges 
)0 Total Salas/Brokers Commission based on price $ 
Division of Commission (Una 700) as follows. 
)t. $ to 
>2 $ to 





li) Paid From Seller's Funds at Settlement 
>Q. Hems Payable in Connactfon With Loan 
) \, Loan Origination Fee _ 
>2. Loan Discount 
>3. Appraisal Fee 
)4, Credit Report 
>S Lende^t Inspection Fee 
>6. Mortgage Insurance Application Fee to 




K3. Items Required By Lander To Ba Paid In Advance 
)1. Interest from to 
>2 Mortgage Insurance Premium for 







>00. Reserves Deposited Wl 
)01. Hazard Insurance 
K)2. Mortgage Insurance 
>03. City property taxes 
)04. County property taxes 





months <5> $ 
months© S 
months @ $ 
months @ $ 
months© S 
months ® S 










100. Title Charges 
101. Settlement or closing fee 
102. Abstract or title search 
103. Title examination 
104. Title insurance binder 
105. Document preparation 
108. Notary fees 
107. Attorney's fees 
(Includes above items' numbers: 
"*S. Title Insurance 
(Includes above Items' numbers 
109. Lender's coverage 
110. Owner's coveraqe 
111. 
112. 











Secur i ty T i t l e Company 
RA—ir t ty TMt-"|A rnrnp^ny 







200. Government Recording and Transfer Charges 
201. Recording fees: Deed$ 15. OH ; Mortgage ff). Of) ; Release $), 00 •.i5.no 
202. City/county tax/stamps: Deeds ; Mortgage $ 
203. State tax/stsmps: PeedS ; Mortgage $ 
204. 
206. 
300. Additional Settlement Charges -
301. Survey to 
302. Pest Inspection to 
303.T3fAr Sl-nrV Pft-lsSUP FPP F n i m n r p l ^ f ^ r t k p r g *«:~r»r. jn.nn 
304^ qq 4 U^fr.r ^ s ^ ^ " ^ " ^ 
305. 
F U l T m r p Water l lsprs ftssnr- .39 fiO 
400. Total Settlement Chargas (enter on lines 103, Section J and 502, Section K) 164.60 629.00 
TfERS INITIALS iJjJljiL. SELLERS INITIALS: 1121-2 (Rev. 7/87) 
Wte± 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
HANDLING OF FUNDS AND DOCUMENTS; Deposit all funds in connection with this 
escrow in any of our escrow accounts in any federally insured depository selected by you and 
disburse same by the issuance of checks from said account Pay encumbrances in accordance 
with this agreement, prorate all agreed items, and record such escrowed instruments as are 
necessary or proper for commission, and disburse balance of escrowed funds to the party or 
parties entitled thereto If sale be based on contract of sale, deliver such contract and all related 
instruments to designated escrow collection agent Cause fire insurance policies to show the 
interest of the respective parties after closing sale. You are hereby relieved of any obligation to 
determine if fire insurance policy is in force and its premium paid. 
TAXES AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS: It is understood that property taxes are assessed 
and interest on special assessments is charged on a calendar year basis. You are therefore 
instructed to make ail prorations thereof on that basis. In prorating taxes, if the amount of the 
current year's taxes be unknown, use prior year's taxes as a basis. You are hereby released 
from any and uli liability which could arise by reason of any variance between the amount 
payable in taxes on the year of closing and on the said prior year. If parcel being sold be a 
portion of a larger tract and no separate tax assessment is available therefor, no proration 
shall be required to be made in escrow the Buyer and Seller hereby agreeing that they will 
adjust the proration of taxes between themselves. You are to make no proration of unpaid 
principal of special assessments unless specifically instructed to do so. You shall have no 
assessment as may be reported by the various municipal offices involved. 
PRORATIONS: Before prorating items relating to existing encumbrances and in accounting 
(or assumed obligations and impounded reserves, obtain from agent or individual making 
collections thereon all needed information, including rate of interest, payment terms and exist-
ing balances. You are instructed to use information in making required prorations and effect-
ing sef tlcment between the parties and are hereby released from any liability or responsibility 
should the information furnished to and used by you prove to be incorrect. 
CANCELLATION OR AMENDMENT: This escrow may not be cancelled or its terms modi-
fied without consent of all the parties hereto. Should either party to this escrow elect to cancel 
the same, you are instructed to notify forthwith the remaining parties by mailing written 
notice of said election to them and the real estate agent at their last known address. In the 
event of cancellation, all documents are to be returned to the respective parties who shall have 
deposited same with you. If cancellation occurs because of the default of seller and not of buyer, 
you are instructed to refund to buyer all funds escrowed by him, after deducting your charges 
and expenses. However, if cancellation is occasioned by default of buyer and not of seller, you 
are authorized to pay to seller buyer's escrowed earnest money, which shall be forfeited to seller 
and treated as liquidated damages. In the event you have documents executed by both buyer 
and seller, you shall cancel same by marking with the word "void," retaining said documents 
in your files. 
Failure to close this escrow within the period hereinabove provided shall not automatically 
terminate or cancel same. You may continue to regard it as executory until notified to the 
contrary in writing by any of the parties hereto. Should a dispute or controversy arise between 
buyer and seller, you shall hold all monies and documents until such a time as existing differ-
ences shall have been resolved through compromise or a final judicial determination had of the 
rights of the parties. In the event you interplead you may deposit the documents and funds in 
court, deducting all your charges and expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees 
and you will thereupon be relieved of further liability or responsibility in connection with this 
escrow. The parties hereto agree to save you harmless, in the event of any such disagreement 
between the parties, against all liability, costs, damages, expenses and attorney's fees that 
may arise or which may be incurred or sustained by you by reason hereof 
Page Two 
General Conditions 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS: Parties hereto agree that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, 
assumes no responsibility or liability of unrecorded tax or mechanic's liens, personal property 
taxes, mining locations, rights of parties in possession of the premises, surveys, location of 
improvement or boundary lines, use of property in compliance with zoning ordinances or 
restrictions and such other matters as are excepted under Schedule "B" of the standard form 
policy or title insurance. It is further agreed that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, makes no 
representation as to the sufficiency or validity of the documents deposited herewith nor makes 
any representations as to the value, quantity, or condition of the property described herein. In 
the event sale includes furniture or other personal property, it is understood and agreed that 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY has made no search of the records for chattel mortgages or 
conditional sales contracts and does not certify as to title thereto, and buyer accepts the bill of 
sale with understanding. Parties hereto further agree that SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
assumes no liability for and is expressly released from any claim or claims whatsoever in 
connection with the receiving, retaining, and delivering of the above papers, except to account 
for payments made thereon, from which it is authorized to deduct its customary collection 
charges and expenses, together with any amount which may be required to pay costs, attorney 
fees and other legal expenses by reason of any litigation or controversy which may arise in 
connection herewith. 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, as ESCROW AGENT and ESCROWEE, assumes no respon-
sibility for determining that the parties to this escrow have complied with the requirements of 
the Truth in Lending, Consumer Credit Protection Act, (Public Law 90-321), Utah Consumer 
Credit Code, or similar laws. 
ADDITION TO GENERAL .CONDITIONS 
DISCLOSURE OF TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS: In terna l Revenue Code 
S e c t i o n 6109(h) imposes requirements for f u r n i s h i n g , d i s c l o s i n g , and 
inc lud ing taxpayer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers i n tax returns on the p a r t i e s t o 
a r e s i d e n t i a l rea l . s t a t e t r a n s a c t i o n invo lv ing s e l l e r - p r o v i d e d f i n a n c i n g , 
S c l ^ l . n M ? 1 d ! ! , t M i t h a t t h . 6 d i 8 c l o ™ r « r e p o r t i n g requirements are 
e x c l u s i v e o b l i g a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s to t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n and t h a t 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY i s not o b l i g a t e d to transmit the t L P 5 « 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n numbers to the I n t e r n a l Revenue S e r v i c e or to the p a r t i e s 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY i s not rendering an opinion c o n c e r n i n g t h e e f r e c t of 
t h i s law on t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n , and the p a r t i e s are not a c t i n g ' on any 
s ta tements made or omitted by the escrow or c l o s i n g o f f i c e r . 
To f a c i l i t a t e compliance with t h i s law. the p a r t i e s to t h i s escrow hereby 
i d e n t i f i ^ , ^ ^ C U R I T Y - T I T L E COMPANY to r e l e a s e any p a r t y ' s taxpayer 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n number t o any reques t ing party who i s a party to t h i s 
t r a n s a c t i o n . The request ing party s h a l l d e l i v e r a w r i t t e n reques t t o 
escrow. The p a r t i e s hereto waive a l l r i g h t s of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y regard ing 
m 5 S v t t S ? a y e r l d ! n t i f l c a t i o * ™* b «r* • « * agree to hold SECURITx 
I S / « r ^ , harmless a g a i n s t any f e e s , c o s t s , or judgments incurred 
numbers e j e c t i o n with the , re l ease of taxpayer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
fr> 
P R O V O C I T Y 
B U I L D I N G I N S P E C T I O N 
T O O B T A I N A 
C O M P L E T E 
B U I L D I N G P E R M I T Y O U M U S T 





P r o v i d e 2 c o m p l e * t e s e t s o f P-L a n s 
a n d 3 p l o t p l a n s t o t h e B u i 1 d i ng-
I n s p e c t i o n D e p a r t m e n t . T h e s e 
s e t s M U S T i n c l a a d e : floor plan, elevations, wall sections, 
basement or foundation plan, (see attached sheets for example drawings 
and pertinent code requirements). Minimum S c a l e 1/4" - l 1 
]E*ill o u t a B u i l d i n g P e r m i t 
A p p l i c a t i o n a t t h e B u i l d i n g -
I n s p e c t i o n D e p t -
I n c 1 u d e b o t h t h e ov\rner f s a n d 
c o n t r a c t o r 1 s s i g n a t u r e s . 
Th.e p l a n s a r e r e v i e w e d ^ fc>^r r 
A- Z o n i n g D e p a r t m e n t 
B . E n g i n e e r i n g D e p t -
O . B u i l d i n g I n s p e c t i o n 
< T h i s r e v i e w p r o c e s s u s u a l l y 
t a l c e s a b o u t O N E v g r e e i c ) 
P u r c h a s e t h e P e r m i t s f r o m t h e 
B u i l d i n g I n s p e c t i o n D e p a r t m e n t . 
( A l 1 ± : e e s a r e d u e a t t h i s t i m e . ) 
C O M M E R C I A L 
S T E P S T H A T 
P L A N S H A V E S O M E A D D I T I O N A L 
R E Q U I R E M O R E T I M E . 
1. A r c h i t e c t a n d / o r Eng inee r s tamps may a l s o be r e q u i r e d . 
2 . A c o n t r a c t o r s l i c e n s e i s r e q u i r e d e x c e p t when a home owner w o r k s on 
h i s / h e r own r e s i d e n c e . 
A B U I L D I N G P E R M I T I S R E Q U I R E D P O R r 
1. A l l new s t r u c t u r e s and a d d i t i o n s t o e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s 
2 . A l l a c c e s s o r y b u i l d i n g s , s t o r a g e , g a r a g e , e t c i n e x c e s s of 120 s q f t . 
3 . A l l f e n c e s more t h a n 6 f i n h e i g h t 
4 . A l l r e t a i n i n g w a l l s more than 4 ' i n h e i g h t measured from b o t t o m of f t g , 
5 . A l l remodel work t h a t i s no t m a i n t e n a n c e . 
!*Ois 
This check list should be used in conjunction with the sample drawings to 
assist you in preparing a set of drawings for your penait application. Be 
sure that all requirements are clearly shown on your plans. Plans must be 
drawn on unlined or graph paper with a straight edge, minimum 8£n x 11" size. 
1. Concrete:"3000 # PSI, S 1/2 bag mix, 
2. Footings: Provo City recomnends a 10ff x 20" footing 
with 2 #4 bars continuous. 
3. Foundations: #4 bars 24" o.c. each way with a 30" dowel, 
from footing to foundation every 24". Show dimensions of 
foundation wall. 
4. * Frost level protection for footings: 30" earth coverage 
show earth to wood clearance. 
5. Show dimensions of building rooms and doors. 
6. Show.set backs on plot plan^  lot dimensions. 
7. Foundation: Minimum of 6tf above final grade. 
8. Redwood plates are required on concrete. 
9. Anchor bolts: 1/2" x 10"- 6 feet on center with a minimum 
of 2 anchors per piece. 
10. Provide combustion air to the furnace. 
11. Provide a floor drain by the water heater. 
12. Show location: Electric meter and service panel. 
13. Show GFI protection on receptacles in baths, garages and on 
outside plugs. 
14. Show location of electrical lights-££-), switches-(^), and 
outlets- (=©3: minimum of one outlet every 12 feet of wall space. 
15. Bedroom windows: 4° 3* minimum window sills: 44" maximum height 
from finished floor. 
16. Windows within 18" of floor, 18" or wider-tempered or protected. 
17. V/indow size: Minimum 10% floor area - 501 operable. 
18. Brick ties: 16" o.c. each way - 1" x 22 gauge. 
19. Attic access required: 22" x 30" minimum 
20. Water closet/shower: 30" minimum required dimensions 
21. Vent fan required in baths without windows. 
22. Studs- 16" o.c. or 24" o.c. 
23.*CEILIKG~J0ISTS SPANS: 2 x 4 , 24" o.c. - 9f 8T max. 
2 x 6 , 24" o.c. - 15T 2" max. 
2 x 8 , 24" o.c. - 19f 11" max. 
2 x 10, 24" o.c. - 251 5" max. 
24.* ROOF RAFTER SPANS: 2 x 6 - 24" o.c. - 91 2" max. 
2 x 8 - 24" o.c. - 12' 1" max. 
2 x 10- 24" o.c. - 15! 5" max. 
2 x 12- 24" o.c. - 18l 9" max. 
25.* FLOOR JOIST SPANS: 2 x 8 , 16" o.c. - 13' 1" max. 
2 x 8 , 24" o.c. - 11f 5" max. 
2 x 10, 16" o.c- 16f 9" max. 
2 x 10, 24" o.c- 14! 7" max. 
2 x 12, 16" o.c- 201 4" max. 
2 x 12, 24" o.c- 17' 9" max. 
26.* HEADER SIZES: 4 x 4 - 4 ' span 
4 x 6 - 4'to 61 span 
4 x 8 - 6! to 81 span 
On edge if tv.r> pieces 
*A11 spans are based on Douglas Fir £2 or better.* 





















Cei l ing/ f loor headroom: 71 6n minimum 
All S t a i r s : 6 f6 , f minimum headroom. 
All S t a i r s : 7 1/2 r i s e max - 10M run minimum. 
.All S t a i r s : 50M - 34M handra i l s , 56u guardrails . 
Shear bracing required on both s ides of each corner and 
every 25 ! l i n e a l f ee t . 
Insula t ion: All ex ter ior walls R - l l , cei l ings R-19 double 
glazed windows: Basement and crawl space also must be 
insula ted . 
Crawl space vents required: 1 1/2 sq. f t . per every 25 l i n e a l 
feet . 
Crawl space access : 18" x 24,f minimum. 
At t i c vents requi red : 1/lSOth of f loor area. 
Hearth: 20" minimum in f ront , 12" each side of opening. 
Chimney cap: 4ft minimum with d r i p edge. 
One hour f i r ewal l with s e l f - c l o s i n g door between house 
and garage. 
Smoke de tec to r s recuired in bedroom access areas . Interconnect i f m u l t i 




Exterior s id ing or covering 
In t e r io r wall and ce i l i ng covering 
Carports: 12n s o f f i t or use e x t e r i o r grade plywood or 
use exterior, grade gypboard. 
48.Method of attachment 
49. Type of footing and dimensions 
50. Size and spacing of supports 
51 . Size and span of beam 
The c i rc led numbers refer to the preceding l i s t . They indica te the t y p i c a l 
location of the plans for the appropriate statement explaining conzrtrucfcion 
d e t a i l s , i . e . What the building i s made of (materials), i t s s i z e 
(dimensions), and any special methods of construction ( technique). 
THE NUMBERED CIRCLES ARE FOR EXAMPLES ONLY, YOU 
MAY NEED MORE INFORMATION. CAREFULLY CHECK THE REQUIRHvENT 
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The circled numbers refer to the preceding list. 
They indicate the typical location of the plans 
for the appropriate statement.explaining 
construction details. i.e. What the building 
is made of (materials), its size (dimensions), 
and any special methods of construction (techniqu 
© 
® 
G/l,K£Gi <Z ALPORT 
L. Jack Peterson Y 
95 East 500 South 
P O Box 84 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
To whom it may concern 
[ was contacted by Dan Smith and went over the property and the layout of the home on 
the 1 Ith of August 1993, and inspected the footings on Friday 13 th It was called to his attention 
at that time that the footings were not at proper depth, but he staled this would be taken care of 
when the back till was put around the house The basement walls were inspected on the 16th and 
the rough plumbing on the 18th, The rough electrical and plumbing, along with the framing 
inspection, was done on the 8th and 9th of September 1993. I checked the building progress on 
both the 28th and the 29th of October I also visited the job site another occasion and Dan and I 
discussed the venting of the attic Dan felt that it was adequate. 
Dan and Carol were living in the home when we asked to do the final inspection on the 
home on the 8th of November. At that time they hadn't built the deck on the back of the house 
and the final grading hadn't been done as well. At the time the final inspection was done, I 
discussed with Dan the fact that the access into the attic did not meet the minimum code 
requirements and that the smoke detectors had not been installed.. None of these items had been 
corrected at the time that the house was sold to the Moore's The Moore's did the landscaping 




l ( jadc Peterson, Fillmore City Building Inspector 
William Moore and Mary Moore vs Dan Smith, et al. 
Deposition of L Jack Peterson, taken on February 20, 2003 
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1 July 29th. 
2 A. I think this is when we were working on the 
3 permit, getting permits to do it. 
4 Q. Okay. Any other references to Dan Smith 
5 that you found in there? 
6 A. Oh, it goes all the way through. There(s 
7 one here. I don't know whether that was electrical. 
8 Q. Do you mind if we make a copy of that? I 
9 A. I can make copies for you as quick as we get! 
10 through. That would give you the dates. 
11 Q. Yeah, it would give us the dates. I don't 
12 know how that would do. 
13 A. It doesn't do a whole a lot. I have a big 
14 planner if I have a problem I write down. The final 
15 inspection was on November the 8th. I was surprised I 
16 hadn't thrown this away. 
17 Q. Where did you find that? 
18 A. I had it stuck in the tax box at home. 
19 MR. HADLEY: Love it. 
2 0 MR. DIXON: There you go. 
21 Q. All right. I think what we'll do, we'll 
22 call Exhibit 1 -- when you make a copy of that we'll 
23 attach that as a exhibit as Exhibit 1. 
24 Copy of what do we call that, a day planner? 
25 A. Just a day planner. 
l>«*SL***U«K«-5«"*«« **•***<•/& nr^tib"**"* «JS<-*?Wi>-f*«*«. j> 3*Mi*r*«»uav>>-6 A / W •*****.r/i' ^/*~*^>«-*< v»^*?i,^<-*Sw*ili^S^rn^**>J*2M'<^<v*Z+*l'<t-*Z: 
Robert Stanley Court Reporting, Inc. 
Post Office Box 3079 St George, Utah 84771 (435)688-7844 
ADDENDUM 3 
£T 
A. BRYCE DIXON, ESQ (#889) 
AARON M. WAITE, ESQ (#8992) j > 
DIXON, TRUMAN, BANGERTER & FISHER, P.C. 
192 East 200 North, Suite 203 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435) 652-8000 
Facsimile: (435) 652-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
( * • 
, ; / " / 




DAN SMITH, individually and as 
Trustee of the Dan Irvin Smith 
Inter Vivos Trust, and CAROL SMITH, 
individually and as Trustee of the 
Carol L. Smith Inter Vivos Trust, 
Defendants 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CLAIMS 
Civil No.: 000700142 MI 
Judge: EYRE 
THERE ARE NO ISSUES OF FACT. THE COURT NEED 
ONLY INTERPRET THE CONTRACT 
Plaintiffs have not raised an issue of fact. They contend that paragraph two is disputed. 
However, Plaintiffs acknowledge in their opposition papers that the Court has already ruled that 
Dan Smith built this home for his primary residence and that when he sold it to the Moores it was 
a used home. Plaintiffs do not dispute the quoted provisions of the contract. The Plaintiffs only 
Page 1 of 11 
dispute the interpretation of the contract. This case is therefore ripe for summary judgment. 
THE SMITHS RECEIVED NO NOTICE FROM THE 
BUILDING INSPECTOR OF ANY BUILDING VIOLATION 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have no contract claims except those arising under the 
"Seller's Warranties" under paragraph "C" of the Earnest Money Agreement.1 That paragraph 
provides as follows: 
H C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no 
claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property 
which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; . . . ( c ) the plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances 
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing. 
Regarding clause "C(a)" they argue that the alleged laundry list of code deviations raised 
by their experts constitute "building violations" and that Dan Smith had knowledge of these 
"building violations" because he built the house as an owner-builder. They are wrong in this 
interpretation of the contract. 
Clause "C(a)" contemplates a situation where a builder's construction has been "red-
tagged" by a building inspector; in other words, the building inspector has notified the builder 
that a certain deviation from code must be corrected. The builder must have received such a 
"claim or notice" from the building inspector. If so, he must correct it prior to closing. Here, 
1
 Plaintiffs argue some vague notion of good faith and fair dealing but they offer no 
specifics of how such a term was breached so it is not discussed in this brief. 
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however, Dan Smith received a final inspection and a certificate of occupancy from Jack 
Peterson, the building inspector. (Ex. 3, Certificate of Occupancy) Peterson never red-tagged 
this home. (Ex. 1, Peterson depo. at 18,19) Therefore, Smith did not "receive a claim or notice 
of any building . . . violation." 
Plaintiffs' interpretation of clause "C(a)" is erroneous for the following five reasons: 
1. Plaintiffs' interpretation of this contract language presumes that every 
deviation from code would be a "building violation" even the deviations where the building 
inspector has specifically determined them to be insignificant from a structural or safety 
standpoint and thus passed them off. If every code deviation were a "building violation", then 
every builder would be liable to correct inconsequential deviations that come to light decades 
after the construction of the house, even though the building inspector passed them off. 
2. If every code deviation were a "building violation," then every builder would 
remain liable when the deviation has been presented to the building official who, under the 
discretion granted him by the Uniform Building Code, waived strict compliance, Dan 
Smith knew there were certain deviations from code in the construction of this house. But he 
took care of them properly. Dan Smith called attention to the building inspector that the stairs 
did not comply with the building code. The inspector considered the matter and waived strict 
compliance. (Ex. 1, Peterson depo. at 66) Jack Peterson also considered the attic access, found it 
a little small but found the deviation insignificant and so passed it off (Id. at 53) Similarly, the 
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building inspector considered the amount of the roof ventilation and did not require Smith to 
change the ventilation and passed it off. {Id. at 48) 
Plaintiffs' interpretation thus assumes that Dan Smith has breached his contract where he 
has knowledge of a building code deviation that the building inspector has expressly determined 
not to be a building violation. Obviously, such an interpretation is outrageous. If it were 
adopted, it would have vast, unexpected and disastrous consequences to home builders all over 
the state of Utah. 
3. The word "receive" implies just this kind of notification from a building 
inspector. One "receives" notice from another, not from himself One "receives " notice of a 
building code violation from a building inspector. He may already know there is a violation but 
he does not "receive a notice or claim" from himself. 
4. Plaintiffs' interpretation of clause "C(a)" runs counter to the plain language 
of the rest of the agreement. Plaintiffs agreed under paragraph "IB" to buy a house "as is" and 
with no warranties other than those in paragraph "C." Plaintiffs interpretation of paragraph "C" 
would nullify this plain language. It would make every home seller liable for all conceivable 
construction defects when the seller intends that the buyer is buying the house subject to all such 
defects. That after all is the definition of "as is."2 Plaintiffs' faulty interpretation of this contract 
2
 The phrase "as is" in the real estate means the buyer takes subject to all existing 
conditions and excludes breach of contract claims and warranties. 8 ALR 5th 312, § 9. Also see 
Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc. 875 P.2d 570 (Ut App 1994). 
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is thus: 'Plaintiffs take the house "as is", subject to all defects with the exception of all 
' ' . . , * * * : . ' - ::".*• ^hMid /d . 
In this contract under paragraph "1(e)" Plaintiffs acknowledged they inspected the house 
to their satisfaction and accepted "it in its present physical conditio! 1.' " " I 'hey were given the 
opportunity in n a r a ^ r - "6" to insist upon other warranties hi/ ...*-.*•-*.! (!u-; t,. ,-.k lor 
"none." To accept Plaintiffs too broad interpretation of paragraph "C" would be to deny the 
provisions of the contract 
5. Plaintiffs presume that Dan Smith knew the building code as they interpret it 
and chose to deviate fi tin i c nil .: <*•- Tit.", .. * . \- n.., \ u\c"< >• ..i « -^t ^resented in 
this case. Without proof Plaintiffs simply assert that Dan Smith must have known of the alleged 
code violations because he built homes m :->ait Lake L'Hy m tiK- i1; -\v I In.- i., iaisc ior several 
reason. 
Some of the alleged code violations are based on interpretation of the code where the 
building inspector gave to owner-builders the standard handout listing certain building code 
icquiK-m- hi ; ; •-• i.^-i. uqn% ••: -.: • .„<i HCILU- .;. ;••..*! wi second Appendix ofExhibits, 
as Ex. 2) (Ex. 1, Peterson depo at 26, 30) It stated that the maximum length of a floor joist was 
3
 uan bmmi Duilt over 200 homes in Salt Lake County in the 1970's. (Ex. 3, Dan Smith 
depo at 25) He moved to Fillmore in 1979/1980 and became a dairy farmer. (Id. at 69,70) 
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13 feet one inch. Plaintiffs' expert has stated by his interpretation of the code that the maximum 
length u •«.- H i ;; ,-\ M.'t: i . ,...ni /Cd b^- < \. i • '• - i ; f,.,.. ..* im-
proper and it was within the discretion of the building inspector to choose. (Ex. 4, Steenblik 
depo. ai i iY>- i«M)j Ooes paragraph » mean nere mat U;in Mmtn is subject to liability lor 
having notice of a building code violation if lie followed precisely what the building inspector 
told him to do? 
MurvP11 •*' l !-' *" t '- p--f f * , , r ' - ' ' 4 ; iii,pv;ct:;i > .lie n c c e ^ . e A k w t i r ' i 
always clear what the code requires. (Ex. 6, Barrett depo. at 25-27) There are code changes every 
few years that could trip up any contractor, (U. at 2(\ ^.. • i, e_ . ii Dan Smith thought he was 
complying because he built the home as he built it in Salt Lake Citv years before dees he h.w e 
knowledge of a building code violation such that he has breached the contract? For example, 
Dai 1. Si 111th did not 1: ealize the code had. cliai iged the 1 equii ei nent foi a staii ! landi ail. (Exhibit 5, 
Smith depo. at 137, 138) The 1991 code allowed a straight handrail. The next code (1993) 
required the handrail return and attach to the wall. Jack Peterson did not know about this 
handrail change so he passed it off. (Exhibit 1, Peterson depo. at 52) i n w 'Minth eh.i: > e<! u ifh 
actual knowledge of committing a code violation even though it is so recent that the building 
m s p e c t e ' - {"">'• ' , ;•... , ; r j v m l ' U, in [,. lv .. -
having remedied this code deviation prior to closing when he never realized it existed? 
Moreover, Plamtitls accuse Dan Smith oi knowingly breaching the building code on the 
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issue of attic ventilation. However, the building code provides that the amount of ventilation is 
! ' . . ( i ! ' i m i n i . J >iMi " ' • • i l ^ t . M i n w i - -• '• *!•' .-. n i M ) i _ \ - h ! * i : 
determined that Dan Smith complied. (Ex. 6, Barrett depo. at 36, 37) (Ex. 1, Peterson depo.at 
18). 
Clearly, the building code is not as black and white as Plaintiffs would lead the court to 
believe. There is much discretion and interpretation left to the building inspector. That is why 
l - . J l i ' . d ' '' ' l " i . * ' K ' i . ! | , ( "" \ K - •• M i l l ' l l l > p t L i* 
red-tagged a code deviation. 
Plaintiffs' strained interpretation ignores the tact that the building inspector, having 
inspected, found compliance, or having exercised discretion where appropriate and or having 
waived certain code deviations, granted final inspection and signed off on the certificate of 
occi lpai ic)' Foi ai lother example, Jacl c Petei son says he exan lined ai id foi ind pi oper flashing at 
the windows and passed that off. (Exhibit 1, Peterson depo. at 55). Plaintiffs' expert has never 
done any destructive testing to see if there really is flashing but still alleges that there was no 
flashing. (Ex. 7, itemization of alleged code deviations, item #9.) The Plaintiffs1 interniviati< > 
the contract would require Dan Smith repair this "building violation." How could he have notice 
contend that to avoid these anomalous scenarios mentioned above the contract phrase "notice or 
ciauj. ..nisi De construed to mean that which comes from a buildiiig inspector. 
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THE A L L E G E D CODE D E F E C T S DO NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF THE 
WARRANTY THAT THE ELECTRICAL, PLUMBING AND H V A C SYSTEMS WOULD 
BE IN SOUND OR SATISFACTORY WORKING CONDITION AT C L O S I N G 
The arguments made above apply for the most part to this section. Plaintiffs desire to 
not belong and even though claims of such alleged defects were expressly waived by the 
Plaintiffs in the contract. 
One thing is very different. Under this clause ofth. -/onn.t, t \\\.' -hit ,• i 
nature electrical, plumbing or heating and air-conditioning (HVAC) can apply. A review of the 
lai mdi ) list (lb ;: 1 am ie.:? :ed hei et a.) sho .- ";s that • : nl> it "i i i.s 10 (cai ill :iiig of bathi ( >oi i i f ixtures), 15 
(no water pressure reducing valves), 22 (strapping of water heater) 23-25, 29,30 (non- GFCI 
circuits and failure to label electncal panel), S^^ (no outlet in basement) 35 (add grounding kit to 
circuit breaker box) and 41 , 42 ^luinhi*-!* KTUUN , t n ivp<.-\ 
this contractual provision because these are the only items that relate to plumbing, electrical or 
• • . i • • • . . ; .[iii.^-eu i • •!'. u.e eoniracuia ims 
under paragraph "C(c)". 
However, even these items do not give rise to a contract claim because they do not affect 
the satisfactory working condition of the systems. The clause a t ' V d - r dm , • ~< w.mnui aj'ain^t 
defects. It warrants that these three systems would be working at the time of closing. There is no 
evuleP' 'l> ' !ii" - - • " . ^ . I M i • .i LLinswere 
Paue X 
discovered over six years aucr me sale 01 UIL. nouse. i : \en now mere is no evidence that these 
systems are not in sound working order. Mere deviations ixom code do not necessarily mean that 
the electrical or plumbing systems were not "working." If they were not "working" properly 
I 'laintiffs w 01 i.lei ha \ e 1 ::i i :» -:,i ' i i. al:> ::in it it right aftei tl iej i nov ed in 
In fact, as shown in the previous motion for summary judgment the only actual damage to 
the house mat nainims nave suffered is some small water iiiti iisioii and buckling of some of the 
roof shingles. There is no evidence of serious damage to the integrity of the house. There is no 
allegation that the roof leaks. (See Ex.8, Moore depo at 20.) There is no known damage to 
footings or found •> \W!*MV *'*» ]\i\.u\ u - ^ K -. * -• ,
 lv_ 
evidence of electrical blackouts, no evidence of heating or air conditioning failure. There was no 
breach of clause "C(c)" at the tii lie of the closing and there has been no such, breach since. 
The only alleged defect that Plaintiffs attempted to bring within the scope of clause 
"C(c)" is the attic ventilation. They say that because the surface of the attic vents was not large 
alleged code violation did not manifest itself until years later. 
J-;• :. nits alleged coue vioKiiion ... nvi contemplated by a clause that talks about the 
plumbing, electrical and HVAC systems being in sound working condition. One does not speak 
of attic ventilation as being in any kind of "working condition." The size of the vents in the attic 
]> !« , *< ) 
ULI jaeijiuuv .•'.•:.'• i-.-\ :..ui^ .u uiau ana say mat my attic ventilation is 
broken down and not working. 
Second, attic ventilation is not part of the HVAC (heating, air-conditioning and 
built to supply a home with hot and cool air. The mere placement of vents designed to allow hot 
•-Map .\:. - ...;.•: c j . . viiuai a.s pan \)i me i i \ Av system. 
Since Plaintiffs have not attempted to squeeze any other of the items on their laundry list 
into clause "C(c)", there is nothing more to discuss. Clearly, the court can rule as a matter of law 
that Plaintiffs mh-MMvi ,?nw .;'*'< m^n^n ' ! \\\<r- Hve^ ris-1 1 
CONCLUSION 
I'lamiili- n.t\i aii;.^,!- iii.ii tik.iL i> no nupiicu wairam\ of habitability in Utah. I 'hey 
admit there are no contract provisions except those found in paragraph "C" upon which to 
predicate a claim of breach of contract. Their interpretation of the scope of said paragraph is 
wronp as a matter of ! - • P^.ra^mnh "< ' A .--. i = ~ • • • .- ih-I .= <-- i-.t • ..:. -i •*.(.. ..^VM-.Np' 
by their experts some seven years after they bought the house. Since Dan Smith never received 
•J: < .si: n ' ^ - . • . kimg inspector clause "Ma) does 
not apply. None of the items on the laundry list constitute a breach of ctC(c)" because the 
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electrical, HVAC and plumbing systems have all been in sound working condition since the 
house was sold. 
Dated this j3^ - fc day of ty&i 2004. 
DIXON, TRUMAN, BANGERTER & FISHER, P.C. 
ACKryc 
AttorneysTor Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the r?_ day Qp^y^^^c^^- , /2004 ,1 mailed a true an correct 
copy of the foregoing in the United States mail afSt. George,^5tah, with first class postage 
prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Gregory B. Hadley 
James K. Haslam 
HADLEY & ASSOCIATES 
2696 North University Avenue Suite 200 
Provo,UT 84604 
c^ 
An Employee of Dixon, Truman, Bangerter & Fisher, PC 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Gregory B.Hadley (3652) 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 260 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 377-4403 
Facsimile; (801)377-4411 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




DAN SMITH, et al. 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO COURT'S 
DIRECTIVE REGARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND 
EXPENSES 
Civil No. 00700142 MI 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
Pursuant to this Court's directive regarding Attorney's Fees on June 6, 2005, Plaintiff 
does submit this revised billing summary. Plaintiff has followed this Court's directive and has 
removed all fees, costs and expenses that could be determined to h f^ve no relation to the factual 
development and prosecution of Plaintiff s Breach of Contract Claim. Much of the fees are so 
closely related and intertwined with the Breach of Contract Claim as to be indistinguishable and 
can not now be separated. Attached is Plaintiffs Revised Billing Summary. 
DATED this _ 2 _ day June, 2005. j f 
Gregory B. Had ley 
l ^ 1 
t I"~/*AXZL. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing on this J_2_ 
day of June 2005 to the following: 
Patrick J. Ascione 
Ascione, Heideman & McKay, L.L.C. 
2696 University Avenue, Suite #180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Gregory B Hadley 
Suite 260 Century Park Plaza 
2696 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
Invoice submitted to: 
Mary Moore 
155 West 300 South 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
































Reviewing and analyzing documentation from client 
Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracy; Legal research 
and analysis of claims 
Legal research and analysis 
Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracy; legal research 
and analysis 
Legal research and analysis 
Legal research; telephone conversation with Tanya Tracy 
Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracy; planning strategy 
with Mr. Hadley; met with client; draft Complaint 
Legal research; drafting and revising Complaint; telephone 
conversation with Tanya Tracy; telephone conversation with 
court clerk; met with client 
Reviewing filed Complaint; preparing letter to client, 
Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracey 
Preparing letter to clients 
Telephone conversation with Mrs. Tracy 
Telephone call from Mark O'Barr, electrician 
Telephone conversation with Tanya Tracey; Reviewing fax 
from client 
Reviewing faxed materials; Outlining demand letter 






































































































Telephone conversation with Shane Moore; Drafting demand 
letter to Mr. Smith 
Telephone conversation with client 
Reviewing fax re: service of Smiths 
Reviewing letter from Mr. Dixon; Telephone conversation with 
client 
Draft correspondence to counsel 
Telephone call with opposing Attorney 
Reviewing correspondence; Telephone conversation with St. 
George law firm; Preparing Proofs of Service for filing with 
Court 
Telephone conversation with Mr. Dixon; Planning strategy 
with Mr. Hadley 
Telephone conversation with opposing counsel; Conference 
with client; Draft letters 
Preparing for conference with opposing counsel; Meeting with 
client and friends; Telephone conference with opposing 
counsel 
Planning strategy with Mr. Hadley 
Legal research and analysis 
Conference with client 
Drafting jury demand 
Telephone conversation with Tonya 
Telephone conversation with opposing counsel; Draft letter 
Conference with client 
Reviewing statute; Drafting letter to client 
Conference with client; Review Motion 
Discussing strategy with Mr. Hadley; Reviewing 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Affidavit of Dan Smith 
Analysis of Summary Judgment Motion and Affidavit; 
Telephone conversation with client; Reviewing Pleading; etc. 
Legal research; outlining response to summary judgment 
Legal research and analysis; Outlining response to Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Telephone message from client 
received; outlining facts for affidavit, etc. 
Planning strategy with Mr. Hadley 
Legal research and analysis; Drafting response to Motion for 
Summary'Judgment; Telephone conversation with John 
Petersen; Telephone conversation with client, etc. 
Drafting Affidavit of Mary Moore and faxing to client; 
Preparing statement of material facts; Telephone 
conversation with client 





































































































3/7/2001 JKH Drafting opposing memorandum; Reviewing fax from John 
Peterson; Revising opposing memorandum; Telephone 
conversation with client; Preparing affidavit for John Peterson 
3/8/2001 GBH Review draft of Memorandum 
JKH Drafting and revising Memorandum; Drafting Affidavits for 
John Peterson, Jason Bullock and Mark O'Barr; Telephone 
conversations with client, Jason Bullock and John Peterson; 
Drafting letter to client, Court and opposing counsel 
Telephone conversation with client 
Telephone call from client 
Telephone conversation with Jason Bullock; Revising 
Affidavit; Met with Mr. Bullock; Telephone conversation with 
client; Preparing letter to Court; Preparing letter and faxing to 
opposing counsel 
Reviewing Reply Memorandum from opposing counsel 
Telephone conversation with clerk and client 
Telephone conversation with client and Court clerk 
Telephone conversation with client and Court 
Telephone conversation with Shane 
Telephone conversation with Shane Moore; Telephone 
conversation with Mary; Reviewing Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Amend Complaint; Calendaring 
response time 
Telephone conversation with Mr. Dixon; Reviewing fax from 
Mr. Dixon 
Reviewing Opposing and Supplemental Memorandum from 
opposing counsel; Legal research and analysis; Planning 
strategy 
Legal Research and analysis; Outlining and preparing 
response 
Legal Research and analysis; Drafting Objections and reply 
Memorandum in Support of Alternative Motion to Amend 
Review Objection and Reply Memorandum 
Drafting Objections and Reply Memorandum; Meeting with 
Mr. Hadley to discuss strategy; Revising Objection and Reply 
Memo; Faxing documents to opposing counsel; Preparing 
and reviewing case law to assist Mr. Hadley's preparation for 
Court hearing in Fillmore 
Prepare for Hearing 
Planning strategy with Mr. Hadley; Preparing Response to 
Smith's Reply Memo; Obtaining case law in preparation for 
Court Hearing 
Preparing for, travel to, and appearance at Court Hearing in 
Fillmore, Discussing strategy with clients; Travel back 




























































































Mary Moore Page 4 
6/5/2001 
























































Telephone conversation with client, Preliminary preparing 
Order 
p^rriisRing Mr Smith'c It^pnqurp with Mr Hunter, P.eviewincL. 
hrpn<u*s_with n o p | Telephone call tn Tanya Tracpv 
Planning strategy re Order 
Conference with client 
Telephone call from Marta at Fourth District Court 
Telephone call with opposing counsel 
Draft settlement letter 
Obtaining tapes of hearing, Reviewing tapes to outline and 
prepare order 
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley, Reviewing tape recorded 
for preparation of Order 
Listening to tape of hearing and outlining order 
Preparing Order on Summary Judgment Motions, Reviewing 
audio tape 
Reviewing portions of hearing, Drafting and revising Order 
Met with Bryce Dixon 




Jolnphnnn nnnvnrnntmn with ri iumnn nf Or.ri ipatinnal ^f\ri 
Professional Licensing 
Reviewing fax from Mr Dixon 
Telephone conversation with Bryce Dixon and client 
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley, Reviewing audio tape of 
hearing, Telephone call to Mr Dixon's office 
Discussing strategy with Mr Hadley, Reviewing and 
analyzing letter from Mr Dixon 
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley 
Making decisions to Order, Drafting letter to Mr Dixon 
Revising and sending letter to Order to Mr Dixon 
Discussing strategy with Mr Hadley Reviewing letter ftom 
Mi Dixon, Outlining response 
Discussing strategy with Mr Hadley Planning for response to 
Dixon letter 
Telephone conversation with client 
Outlining response to Mr Dixon 
Draft letter to Mr Dixon, Making revisions to proposed Order, 
Telephone call to Judge Howard's clerk 
Telephone conversation with Mr Dixon, Revising Order, 
Faxing Order to Mr Dixon 
Telephone conversation with Mr Dixon 
Reviewing fax from Mr Dixon, Telephone conversation with 










































































































































Telephone conversation with Fillmore Courthouse, Telephone 
call to Judge Howard's chambers Preparing letter to Judge 
Howard 
Delivering Order to Judge Howard, Obtaining Judge's 
signature on Order 
Telephone conversation with Dixon's office 
Conference with Client 
Met with Mary 
Discussing strategy with Mr Hadley 
Legal research re suggestions of death and substitution of 
parties, Reviewing discovery requests, Planning strategy with 
Mr Hadley 
Conference with client 
Work on expert 
Locate expert, Call client 
Preparing responses to discovery requests 
Preparing discovery responses 
Reviewing pleadings and affidavits in preparing discover 
responses 
Reviewing letters and other documentation in file, Outlining 
discovery responses, legal research Telephone conversation 
with client Preparing responses 
Draft and revise discovery responses, Reviewing 
documentation from client, Conversation with client 
Preparing responses to Requests for Admissions 
Telephone Conversation with Client 
Revising and drafting Responses to Requests for 
Admissions, Reviewing photographs and notes from client 
Drafting and revising discovery responses 
Final drafting of discovery responses Telephone 
conversation with client 
Review Response to Admissions 
Telephone conversation with client, faxing discovery to Mr 
Dixon 
Telephone conversation with Mr Dixon, preparing Certificate 
of Service 
Telephone conversation with Expert Lynn Larsen 
Organize Trial Notebook, Draft letter to Expert 
Reviewing signed discovery responses from client and note 










































































































































Planning strategy with Mr Hadley, Legal Research and 
analysis, Preparing Motion for Substitution and Memorandum 
in Support Telephone conversation with client 
Conference with client 
Telephone conversation with Expert 
Draft letter 
Draft Notice and Order 
Telephone conversation with client 
Conference with client 
Review expert's report on building code violations 
Review and analyze Expert Report, Legal research and 
analysis, Telephone call to Project Analyst, Planning strategy 
Telephone conversation with Sande @ Project Analysts, 
Review prior correspondence with Dixon, Telephone 
conversation with client, Outlining and Drafting letter to Dixon 
Prepare letter to Mr Dixon, Telephone conversation with Mr 
Dixon, Legal research and analysis 
Prepare strategy with Mr Hadley, Telephone conference with 
client, etc 
Analyze strategy, Consult with client 
Conference with client 
Prepare stipulated discovery plan, Motion, Order, Legal 
research 
Revise stipulated discovery plan, Motion and Scheduling 
Order, Prepare cover letter for Mr Dixon 
Discuss strategy, Telephone call to Project Analysts, 
Planning strategy, Outline discovery requests 
Prepare discovery requests and initial disclosures 
Revise schedule order and fax to Mr Dixon 
Prepare letter to Mr Dixon 
Review letter from Mr Dixon's office 
Telephone call to Mr Dixon and Mr Fisher, Prepare and fax 
letter to opposing counsel 
Prepare discovery requests 
Telephone conversation with Nathan Fisher, Telephone 
conversation with client 
Review proposed scheduling order from opposing counsel 
Telephone conversation with client, Plan strategy with Mr 
Hadley 
Various calls to Court and Bryce Dixon, Review Scheduling 
Orders, Draft letter to counsel 
Call Bryce, Call court, Draft letter 
















































































































































Legal research; Review documents; Draft Motion for 
scheduling conference and order and the supporting memo 
Revise and draft motion and memo re: scheduling order 
Review fax from Mr. Fisher 
Telephone conversation with Mr. Fishers office 
Meeting with Expert 
Review proposed interrogatories and requests from experts; 
Prepare further interrogatories 
Review and revise stipulated discovery plan, motion and 
order; Preparing letter to opposing counsel 
Meeting with law clerk re: discovery, Phone conversation with 
Nathan Fisher 
Telephone conversation with law clerk re: discovery 
Prepare formal discovery requests 
Prepare formal discovery requests; Review int. disc, rule 
Telephone conversation with opposing counsel office 
Review letter from opposing counsel; Telephone 
conversation with opposing counsel; Prepare initial 
disclosures 
Prepare letter to Court; Legal research; Finalize disclosures 
Telephone conversation with client; Finalize discovery 
Review faxed initial disclosures from opposing counsel 
Review; Planning strategy with Mr. Hadley 
Review 2nd set of interrogatories from Smiths 
Prepare responses to discovery; legal research on expert 
Prepare outlining expert reports 
Read and outline research 
Research and writing 
Research and writing 
Prepare planning strategy with Mr. Hadley 
Outline information needed in expert reports 
Research 
Prepare proof chart 
Meeting with Mr. Haslam and law clerk 





















































































































Meeting with Mr Hadley and Mr Haslam 
Prepare proof chart and meeting 
Legal research re amendment of complaint 
Research 
Prepare expert reports, subpoena to City of Fillmore 
Planning strategy 
Telephone conversation with Mark O'Barr 
Telephone conversation with Nathan Fisher, Phone 
conversation with Jason Bullock, Prepare letter to O'Barr 
Prepare letter to Mr Fisher, Telephone conversation with Mr 
Bullock, Prepare reports, Outline defects for discovery 
Review new discovery requests from Smiths, Prepare letter 
to Sheriff, Phone conversation with client 
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley and law clerk 
Draft letter, Consultation with client, Retain appraiser 
Telephone conversation with client, Review discovery 
requests and outline responses 
Prepare expert reports, Legal research 
Telephone conversation with Mr Hatch, Planning strategy 
with Mr Hadley, Prepare discovery responses Legal 
research re Motion to Amend (cause of action) 
Telephone conversation with Mr Steenblik, Finalize expert 
report for Radford and Steenblik, Prepare letter to Mr Fisher 
For professional services rendered 
Additional Charges 
GBH Filing Fee 
12/13/2000 GBH Service of Summons and Complaint to Mr & Mrs Smith 
2/6/2001 GBH Long Distance 
2/9/2001 GBH Jury Demand 
3/8/2001 GBH Long Distance 
4/9/2001 GBH Long Distance 
b/4/2001 GBH Ordei tapes 
6/7/2001 GBH Long Distance 
7/11/2001 GBH Long Distance 
8/16/2001 JKH Copy Costs 































































































































































































































































Total Costs $1,184.52 
Gregory B Hadley 
Suite 260 Century Park Plaza 
2696 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
Invoice submitted to 
Mary Moore 
155 West 300 South 


















Telephone conversation with with Marlen Stevens, Searching for 
alternate appraisers, etc 
Telephone conversation with client 
Telephone conversation with Steve Hatch 
Preparing discovery responses and motion to amend 
Telephone conversation with city employees re subpeona, 
Telephone conversation with Sheriffs office, Reviewing fax from 
Millard County Sheriff, etc 
Reviewing subpoened documents from City of Fillmore 
Reviewing subpoened documents from City of Fillmore 
Analyzing documentation from city, Planning strategy, Telephone 
conversation with client 
Proof Chart, Research, etc 
Talk with appraiser 
Legal research, Preparing motion to amend 
Draft Motion to Amend and Memorandum 
Telephone conversation with Nathan Fisher 
Preparing letter to opposing council and amended complaint 











































































1 1/12/2002 GBH 
Telephone conversation with Mr Fisher and Mr Dixon, reviewing 
letters from opposing counsel 
Preparing Notice of Deposition, drafting letter to opposing counsel 
drafting letter to client 
Legal research, finalizing Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and 
Memorandum, Revising letter to opposing counsel 
Legal research, review documents, preparing response to Third Set 
of Dis 
Draft letter to Mary, review answers 
Preparing expert report for Hatch, telephone call to Mr Hatch 
Reviewing opposing memorandum, Discussing strategy with Mr 
Hadley, telephone converation with Mr Hatch 
Legal research and copies at BYU law school, review and anaylize 
opposing memo, Review correspondence, prior court date, and other 
documents, Draft and revise Reply Memo, . . . 
UcvK K0f treslaxw to 
Consultation with Mary 
Reviewing lettei from Mr Fisher 
Meeting with Mr Hadley to discuss strategy 
Preparing Notice to Submit, preparing letter and copies to Mr Fisher 
Talk with Bryce Dixon (Smith) 
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley 
Consultation with Mary 
Preparing letter to Mr Fisher 
Legal research, Revising letter to opposing counsel, Sending 
documents to opposing counsel 
Consultation with client and review motions 
Reviewing Motion and Strategy with Greg 
Telephone court clerk, Draft Notice to Submit and Motion for 
Enlargement 
Telephone conversation with court clerk, draft Order, Review Motion 
Talk with Defendant's counsel 
Talk with Bryce Dixon 
Draft Memonalization of Agreement and letter 











































































































Meeting with Court Clerk and Experts 
Talk with Nathan, Review Code, Draft lettert o Jason Bullock 
Draft Expert Qualifications letter and Objection to hearing 
Talk with Bryce and Consultation with Mary 
Reviewing letter from Bryce and draft response, review letter from 
Nathan 
Reviewing and organizing file 
Telephone conference with Mr Hadley 
Draft trial preparation outline and go to Law Library 
Talk with Mary, Jim and Nathan Fisher 
Reviewing file, discuss strategy with Mr Hadley, telephone 
conference with client, leqal research 
Meeting with Jim, Consulation with Client and TalK with Aaron 
Talk with court, Draft Notice 
Legal research and analysis, planning strategy with Mr Hadley 
Preparing file 
Reviewing discovery, work on file 
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley 
Reviewing discovery and documents 
Reviewing Plaintiffs discovery and draft objections and answers and 
letter 
Consultation with client, finalize answers and objections to Discovery 
Call Court clerk, draft request, review notes and consultation with 
client 
Planning strategy for hearing, call Marty 
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley 
Prepare Verified Correction to Affidavit and Memorandum 
Reviewing documents & Letters from Mary 
Talk with Mary and Court Clerk 










































































































Reviewing prior correspondence and pleadings, Legal research at 
BYU, drafting Opposing Memo to Motion to Compel/for sanctions 
Attend Telephonic Oral Argument, Consultation with Client, Call 
Court Clerk, Draft notices & Letters, Talk with Mary and Nathan 
Fisher various times, Review Rules 
Preparing for telephone hearing, met with Mr Hadley, telephone 
hearing 
various calls and consultation with client, Call Rex and talk with Mary 
Legal research at law library, drafting and revising opposing memo 
Talk with Rex Radford (twice), call Lloyd and Mary, Talk with Nathan 
Fisher, Draft letter 
Talk with Stephen Hatch and Rex Radford, Talk with Nathan 
Talk with Rex Radford, Court, Mary and Nathan 
Conference call with Court and Nathan, Call witnesses, consultation 
with Mary, work on Order 
Planning strategy with Mr Hadley 
Review notes, draft Am Sch Order and Cover letter to Nathan 
Fisher Work on Designation 
Review prior designation and Draft designations of experts 
Legal research at BYU Law Library, Preparing response to motion 
for sanctions or to compel 
Finalize Memo 
Reviewing Nathan's letter, call Jack Peterson, Consultation with client 
Talk with Nathan Fisher, Consultation with Mary, Call Project Analysts 
Talk with Nathan Fisher, Jason & Mark-Draft Letter 
Talk with Mary 
Telephone calls to Nathan Fisher, Meet with clerk 
Review Briefs and prepare for Oral Arguments 
Prepare Expert outline, Go to Fillmore, Argue Case, Travel Home 
Meet with Experts and Mary's house 
Talk with Mary, Call Terry Kemp, organize letter to Mary and Draft do 
list organization, call Jason, outline preparedness schedule with Terry 












































































1 998 00 






































Meeting with Mr Hadley on Fact gathering 
Legal research at BYU Law Library 
Talk with Mr Hadley on Issues 
Reviewing contract 
Reviewing and write UCA provision 
Draft Memos 
Telephone conversation with Holman 
Draft Memos 
Drafting Memos from 6 55 to 8 10 
Finish Drafting Memos 
Draft Orders, Objections, letter to Nathan, Consultation with client 
and experts, Draft Answers to Discovery 
Finalize, Type & Deliver Memos 
Travel to and From Fillmore 
Meeting with Experts. Go to Courthouse & City Offices, Draft 
objections, finish answers 
Legal research for Proof Sheet 
Logal research,- Draft Maack Caco— 
Meeting with Mr Hadley 
""Legal leseBmh-aftd-Brdfl Maack Cdse~ 
Legal research and draft Schafir case 












































































































Finalize Type and Attempt Delivery 
Prepare for Depositions 
Meeting with Mr Hadley 
Travel to Salt Lake, Attend Lloyd's Deposition, Travel to Fillmore 
Meeting with Mary and Friend 
Talk with Experts, organize Depo questions, Consultation with Mary 
Attend Mark O'Barr's Depo, Attend Mary's Depo, Meet with Jason 
Bullock 
Prepare for Jack and Jason's Depositions, Attend Depos, 
Consultation with Mary 
Prepare for and take Dan and Carol's Deposition, Travel to Provo 




Consultation with Mary, call Experts 
Talk with Jason 
Legal research 
Review letters, talk with Bryce, Rex and Jason 
Draft Memo 
Draft Memo 
Review Defendant's various correspondence, clerk's brief, draft letter 
to counsel, consultation with Mary, call Mark O'Barr, Jason and Rex 
Review Mary's Depo, attend depos of Mary and Rex 
Consultation with Mary, review Jason questions 
Talk with all experts, talk with Mary 
Prepare for Barrett Depo 
Final preparation and attend deposition 
Consultation with client, talk with experts 
Talk with Clerk and Robert Stanley 












































































































Review Code on signing of depo, talk with Mary 
Meeting with Jason Bullock 
Talk with Lloyd 
Consultation with Mary 
Call Experts and Review Moore Deposition 
Meeting with Clerk, Talk with Mary 
Talk with Project Analysts 
Reviewing memos; Draft response; Talk with Court Clerk 
Reviewing memo 
Preparing Points and Authorities. 
Talk with Jason 
Consultation with Mary; Draft letter to Judge; Review Dixon letter; 
Work a brief for expert fees. 
Drafting Expert Witness Fees; Meeting with Greg; Drafting Motion 
and Memo. 
Preparing Briefs 
Drafting a memo; Meet with Greg. 
Talk with Jason - Mark; Consultation with Marty- Finalize Motion and 
Memo; Memo on S.J. Motion 
Redraft Moore S.J.; Copy and Mail. 
Reviewing Bill from Mike and Law Clerk 
Reviewing bill; Call Mary; Draft tender onto court; Draft letter to Mike 
Barrett. 
Talk with Court clerk and Mary. 
Reviewing Brief; Reply to Memo; Draft Notice. 
Talk with Court Clerk. 
Draft Objection to Reply 





















































































3/1/2003 GBH Photocopies 
3/3/2003 GBH Photocopies 
3/5/2003 GBH Fees for Rick Tatton- Court Reporter 
GBH Hotel for Deposition 
3/6/2003 GBH Postage for Smith's Expert Witness Report mailed to Sunrise 
Engineering, Project Analysts and Mary 
3/10/2003 GBH Long Distance Charges 
3/17/2003 GBH Develop Film 
3/20/2003 GBH Mike Barrett Fee 
3/31/2003 GBH Fees for Project Analyst 
GBH Fees for Robert Stanley- Court Reporter 
4/1/2003 GBH Postage 
4/9/2003 GBH Long Distance Charges 
4/22/2003 GBH Reporter fee for Copies of Mary Moore and Rex Radford Deposition 
4/30/2003 GBH Photocopies 
5/7/2003 GBH 4 Copies of Michael Barrett's Expert Report for Deposition 
5/8/2003 GBH Reporter fee for Deposition of Mike Barrett 
5/9/2003 GBH Long Distance Charges 
5/15/2003 GBH Project Analyst Bill (Lloyd Steenblik) 
6/16/2003 GBH Expert Fee - Jason Bullock 
GBH Expert Fee - Mark O'Barr 
GBH Expert Fee - Tender into Court 
8/1/2003 GBH Photocopies 
8/12/2003 GBH Long Distance Charges for July 
10/1/2003 GBH Photocopies 
10/2/2003 GBH Postage 



















































































10/20/2003 GBH FedEx fees for mailing of deposition to Project Analysts 
10/29/2003 GBH Postage 
10/31/2003 GBH Photocopies 
11/7/2003 GBH Long Distance Charges 
GBH Expert Witness- Lloyd Steenblik Invoice of Nov 6, 2003 
12/1/2003 GBH Photocopies 
12/5/2003 GBH Postage 
12/11/2003 GBH Long Distance Charges 
1/28/2004 GBH Long Distance Charges 
1/31/2004 GBH Photocopies December 2003 
GBH Photocopies January 2004 
2/2/2004 GBH Interest @ 18% APR 
2/9/2004 GBH Prior Time and Balance Carried Forward from 2003 
3/30/2004 GBH Long Distance Charges 
3/31/2004 GBH Photocopies 
GBH Postage 
4/29/2004 GBH Long Distance Charges 
5/6/2004 GBH Postage 
5/26/2004 GBH Postage 
5/27/2004 GBH Long Distance Charges 
5/28/2004 GBH Photocopies 
6/30/2004 GBH Long Distance Charges for June 
7/8/2004 GBH Witness Fee (for Jack Peterson) 
GBH Postage 















































































































Filing Fee (Appeal) 
UPS charge for Overnight to Dixon (Appeal) 
Postage 
Long Distance Charges 
Photocopies 





Long Distance Charges 
Postage 
Duplicate copies of pictures to use as Exhibits at Trial 
Postage 
Hotel for Trial 
Expert Fees for Project Analyst Paid Directly by Mary 10/20/00-
$65 00, 11/12/01- $2,500 00, 2/10/02- $3,287 49 
Expert Fee for Project Analysts Trial Attendance and Prep 
Expert Fees for Sunrise Engineering Paid Directly by Mary 8/9/00 
Rex Radford Expert Fees (9 00 hours 2/6/03, 6 25 hours 3/14/03, 
4 50 hours 3/17/03, 1 00 hour 3/20/03) 
Expert Fee for Jason Bullock -Depo time 3/20/03 Never Paid by 
Smiths 













































































2 142 JC 
78 00 







Mary Moore Page zb 
Qty/Pnce Amoun, 
4/14/2005 GBH Photocopies 
GBH Long Distance Charges 
GBH Long Distance Charges 
5/5/2005 GBH Photocopies 

















$34 103 56 
